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DALAM MAHKAMAH RAYUAN MALAYSIA DI PUTRAJAYA

(BIDANGKUASA RAYUAN)

RAYUAN JENAYAH NO : B-05-296-08/2016

ANTARA

MUHAMMAD RAZZAQ BASHIR AHMED … PERAYU (W/PAKISTAN)(NO.PASSPORT: KH 380680)

DAN

PENDAKWA RAYA … RESPONDEN

[Dalam perkara mengenai Perbicaraan Jenayah No. 45A-30-04/2014 Dalam Mahkamah Tinggi di Shah Alam, Selangor Antara

Pendakwa Raya

Dan

Muhammad Razzaq Bashir Ahmed (W/Pakistan)(No. Passport: KH 380680)

Yang diputuskan oleh Yang Arif Hakim Dato’ Indera Haji Abd Halim bin Aman di Mahkamah Tinggi Shah Alam, Selangor pada 29 Julai 2016]

CORAM : MOHD ZAWAWI SALLEH, HMR

KAMARDIN HASHIM, HMR

YAACOB HAJI MD. SAM, HMR

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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

Introduction

[1] The appellant was charged for trafficking in dangerous drugs, to wit

1816.1 grams of methamphetamine, an offence punishable under section

39B(2) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (“the Act”). The offence was said

to have been committed on 16.4.2013 at around 3.30 p.m. at “kawasan

menuju keluar Pemeriksaan Kastam, Balai Ketibaan Antarabangsa, Aras 3,

MTB, Kuala Lumpur International Airport” (“KLIA”).

[2] At the conclusion of the trial, the appellant was found guilty and

convicted by the High Court on the charge and sentenced to death.

[3] Dissatisfied with the impugned decision, the appellant now appeals to

this Court against the decision of the High Court. We heard the appeal on 30

October 2017 and we unanimously dismissed it. We now give our reasons.

The case of the prosecution

[4] Briefly, the prosecution’s case may be shortly stated are as follows. On

16 April 2013, at about 3.30 pm., Sgt 16415 Noor Diana binti Mohamod, the

complainant (SP1) together with her team of narcotics police officers were

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on observation duty at the Baggage Claim Area at Arrival Hall, Level 3, Kuala

Lumpur International Airport, Sepang, Selangor. While carrying out

observation, Det/Cpl 152895 Mohammad Fazlee bin Kesot (SP3) and one

Insp. Khana spotted the appellant walking along the lane of bagagge claim

area of the arrival hall. According to SP3, the appellant appeared to be

“pergerakan perjalanan dia ganjil seolah-olah tampung sesuatu”. SP3 and

Insp. Khana then approached the appellant. Insp. Khana introduced himself

as police officer and asked the appellant for his passport. At that time, the

appellant was seen pulling a luggage bag (P22) heading toward the custom

inspection area at the carousal. The appellant then was instructed by Insp

Khana and SP3 to scan his luggage at the custom scanning machine (mesin

pengimbas kastam) and nothing incriminating was found. The appellant was

then taken by SP3 and Insp. Khana to the Pejabat Siasatan Jenayah

Narkotik, KLIA, Level 3, MTB KLIA and handed over to SP1. SP1 then

instructed SP3 to conduct body search on the appellant. SP3 discovered a

white package tied to the appellant’s right calf (betis kanan) and another

white package tied to the appellant’s left calf (betis kiri). The appellant was

wearing a long trouser. According to SP1 and SP3, the appellant appeared

to be “takut dan gelisah” and shocked upon the discovery of the two white

packages from his person. The appellant was then asked by SP1 to untie

the two packages from both his calves and handed over to SP3. SP3 then

handed over the two packages to SP1. In the present of the appellant, SP1

examined the contents of the two white packages by slightly cut open the

packages for drug testing and discovered that it contains crystalline

substance suspected to be methamphetamine. SP1 then resealed both the

packages with white paper sellotape. Thereafter, the appellant was placed

under arrest and the police report was lodged by SP1 vide KLIA

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Sepang/004181/13 (P5). Subsequently, the appellant was taken by SP1 to

Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Sepang and handed over the appellant together

with the two white packages (P29A and P29B), search list (P4), arrest report

(P5), passport under the name of the appellant (P9), boarding pass under

the name of the appellant (P11), luggage bag (P22), and other personal

belongings of the appellant to SP6, Insp. Murugan Suppiah, the investigating

officer. The handing over was acknowledged by SP6 as evinced in Borang

Serah Terima Barang Kes (P6).

[5] The two white packages and their content were later sent to the

Chemistry Department for chemical examination and analysis. The chemist,

Zulkfeli bin Mohd Edin (SP5), confirmed that the two white packages

contained a total of 1816.1 grams of methamphetamine. Methamphetamine

is listed in the First Schedule of the Act.

Findings at the end of the prosecution’s case

[6] At the end of the prosecution’s case, the learned trial judge found as

follows (pages 17 - 21 of ROA Volume 1):

“Dari keterangan jelas bahawa tertuduh sememangnya

mempunyai kawalan dan jagaan terhadap barang kes

dadah tersebut kerana dadah tersebut memang terjumpa

pada fisikal tertuduh iaitu terikat pada betis-betis kakinya.

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Berdasarkan keterangan tersebut jelas bahawa tertuduh

sememangnya mempunyai milikan terhadap dadah yang

dirampas daripadanya.

….

Dari aspek pengetahuan pula, untuk menghubungkan

tertuduh sebagai mempunyai pengetahuan terhadap

dadah-dadah jenis Methamphetamine tersebut, prinsip

yang diputuskan melalui kes Gunalan a/l Ramachandran &

Ors v. PP [2004] 4 MLJ 489 adalah relevan, bilamana

diputuskan “Knowledge is to be inferred from the

surrounding circumstances of a case”.

Dari aspek pengetahuan juga, terdapat keterangan

mengenai kelakuan dan keadaan tertuduh di dalam kes ini

yang relevan dan juga konsisten untuk menunjukkan dia

memang mempunyai pengetahuan terhadap barang kes

dadah tersebut, barang kes diikat pada kedua-dua betis

kakinya.

Keterangan jelas menunjukkan tertuduh sememangnya

tahu terdapat sesuatu yang terikat pada kakinya. Tertuduh

boleh pada bila-bila masa membuka dan memeriksa

bungkusan yang mengandungi dadah tersebut. Tempat

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dimana dia ikat juga menunjukkan dia membawa sesuatu

yang terlarang atau tidak dibenarkan masuk ke negara ini

dari segi undang-undang.

Malah melalui keterangan SP1 dan juga SP3, semasa

dadah tersebut dibuka dan diserahkan kepada SP1, reaksi

tertuduh adalah takut, gelisah serta terperanjat. Reaksi

sedemikian jelas memperlihatkan akan pengetahuannya

tentang dadah-dadah tersebut.

Ini berdasarkan kepada keterangan bahawa terdapatnya:

a. Dadah disembunyikan – keadaan dimana ia disorok

dengan diikat di kedua-dua betis kiri dan kanan kaki

beliau.

b. Mengangkut dan mengimport – membawa masuk dari

luar negara dadah berbahaya ke dalam Malaysia. Di

dalam kes ini, tertuduh telah menaiki pesawat dari

Lahore, Pakistan menuju ke Kuala Lumpur, yang mana

dadah tersebut sentiasa berada bersamanya, diikat di

kedua-dua betisnya dengan tujuan untuk diedarkan di

negara ini. Kemasukan tertuduh ke Malaysia disahkan

oleh Jabatan Imigresen melalui laporannya.

c. Membawa – tertuduh telah membawa dadah tersebut

apabila dadah tersebut telah disorokkan di dalam dua

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ikatan bertali putih yang dibungkus di dalam

bungkusan-bungkusan berselotape putih.

…….

Dapatan Mahkamah

Setelah saya meneliti keterangan yang disampaikan

melalui 6 orang saksi pendakwaan ini, meneliti kepada

kedudukan kesemua 38 eksibit yang dikemukakan itu,

menimbang kes ini secara keseluruhannya,

mengaplikasikan prinsip ‘maximum evaluation of all

witnesses’ sepenuhnya seperti yang ditetapkan di bawah

undang-undang, dengan ini saya memutuskan bahawa di

akhir kes pihak pendakwaan ini, pihak pendakwaan telah

berjaya membuktikan wujudnya suatu kes yang ‘prima

facie’ terhadap tertuduh ini seperti mana pertuduhan.”

[7] Having found that the prosecution had succeeded in proving a

prima facie case against the appellant, the learned trial judge called

upon the appellant to enter his defence.

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The case for the defence

[8] In his evidence given under oath, the appellant did not dispute

that the drugs were showed to him. However, it was the appellant’s

version that the drugs were not found on his person. The appellant

averred that a body search was conducted on him and nothing

incriminating was found. The appellant further averred that he was then

taken into a room where he was asked to be seated in a sofa and his

luggage was taken into another room. The appellant further averred

that half an hour later, 4 officers approached him and one of them

showed the impugned drugs to him. It is the appellant’s version also

that SP1, the complainant, was never with the appellant at all material

time. The appellant said that he had no knowledge of the said

impugned drugs.

Findings at the end of the defence’s case

[9] After evaluating all the evidence adduced before the Court, the

learned trial judge made the following findings and conclusion at the

conclusion of the trial (p.33 of ROA Volume 1):

“Keputusan

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Setelah saya meneliti serta menghalusi akan keterangan dari

saksi-saksi pendakwaan yang seramai 6 orang kesemuanya,

setelah mendengar dan menghalusi akan keterangan dari

tertuduh sendiri, setelah meneliti serta menimbangkan akan

penghujahan di setiap peringkat, meneliti kepada kedudukan

undang-undang yang berkaitan dengannya, mengkaji otoriti-

otoriti kes yang dikemukakan, menilai serta menimbang kepada

keterangan secara keseluruhannya, dengan ini mencapai suatu

keputusan iaitu pihak pembelaan diakhir kes pembelaan ini telah

gagal menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah

terhadap kes pihak pendakwaan. Tiada keterangan berjaya

dikemukakan bagi menyangkal kesahihan keterangan pihak

pendakwaan bagi tujuan menimbulkan keraguan yang

munasabah. Sehingga di akhir kes pembelaan ini, jelas bahawa

pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes mereka

melampaui keraguan yang munasabah. Oleh itu, tertuduh

dengan ini disabitkan di atas kesalahan seperti mana

pertuduhan.”

[10] The appellant was thus convicted and sentenced to death.

The Appeal

[11] Before us the learned counsel for the appellant advanced two

main grounds to challenge the learned judge’s decision:

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(i) credibility of SP1; and

(ii) passive possession.

[12] However, in the course of submission before us, the learned

counsel for the appellant had indicated to us that, although he had

listed two grounds of appeal in his written submission, he would

nevertheless not proceeding with the second ground, i.e. a case of

passive possession, thus focusing his submission only in respect of

the first ground of appeal, i.e. credibility of SP1.

[13] On the first ground, learned counsel submitted that SP1, the

complainant as the arresting officer, is not a credible witness. It was

submitted that SP1 in her testimony gave two different versions of the

event and that SP1 had concocted her evidence concerning the arrest

of the appellant. At the first instance (first version), SP1 testified that

she was the one who noticed that the appellant was walking rather

suspicious and she introduced herself as police and instructed the

appellant to scan his luggage bag and later took the appellant to the

narcotics office. Her evidence however, was contradicted by SP3. SP3

testified that the appellant was spotted by Insp. Khana and it was Insp.

Khana who had instructed the appellant to scan his luggage. SP3

further testified that it was Insp. Khana that took the appellant to the

narcotics office and SP1 was there. Learned counsel further contended

that SP1 had changed her testimony (second version) and admitted

that she was wrong in saying that she saw the appellant was walking

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at the luggage area. SP1 further admitted that the appellant was taken

to the narcotics office by SP3 and Insp. Khana. CCTV (P23) also

showed that SP1 was not at the carousal where the appellant was first

noticed by Insp. Khana and SP3.

[14] According to learned counsel, had the learned trial judge directed

his mind to the contradiction obtaining in the evidence of SP1 as

discussed above, His Lordship would have found that SP1 was not a

credible witness.

[15] However, that was not the end of the matter. Learned counsel

further submitted that the learned trial judge erred in calling for the

defence of the appellant at the end of prosecution case by relying on

direct evidence to prove the element of trafficking as defined under

section 2 of the Act and at the same time invoking the statutory

presumption under section 37(da) of the same Act. Learned counsel

vehemently was submitted that the learned judge had placed two

different burdens to be discharged by the appellant. This is a serious

misdirection on the part of the learned judge (see: Victor Chidiebere

Nzomiwu & Ors v PP [2013] 2 MLJ 690; Noor Azman Abidin v PP

[2014] 1 CLJ 58).

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Our Decision

Credibility of SP1

[16] In considering whether the learned trial judge had misdirected

himself when he failed to make a finding on the credibility of the SP1,

it is essential for us to reproduce the material part of the learned trial

judge’s conclusion at page 26 ROA Volume 1:

“Meneliti serta menimbangkan kepada keterangan yang

dikemukakan oleh saksi pendakwaan, didapati tidak ada sebab

SP3 dan lain-lain anggota untuk mereka-reka cerita tentang

kejadian yang berlaku. Tertuduh tidak pernah mengenali SP1,

SP3 serta saksi polis yang menahan beliau pada hari tersebut

dan begitu juga disebaliknya. Jadi isu penganiayaan terhadap

tertuduh oleh pihak polis tidak timbul sama sekali.

Keterangan saksi pendakwaan khususnya SP1 dan SP3 jelas

menunjukkan bahawa SP3 telah melihat sendiri tertuduh telah

membuka sendiri kedua-dua ikatan kain putih yang diikat di

kedua-dua betis kaki kanan dan kiri tertuduh yang apabila

diperiksa oleh SP3, ia mengandungi bungkusan berselotape

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putih yang di dalamnya mengandungi bahan kristal jernih disyaki

dadah.

Meneliti keterangan secara keseluruhannya, saya mendapati

keterangan yang diberikan oleh SP3 jelas menerangkan akan

kedudukan sebenar apa yang terjadi diwaktu dan ditempat

pemeriksaan terhadap tertuduh dilakukan.

Keterangan tertuduh yang pemeriksaan badan dibuat di

kawasan pemeriksaan pengimbas kastam, jelas tidak berasas.

Mahkamah telah menunjukkan dan melihat rakaman CCTV di

mana adalah jelas dalam rakaman tersebut hanya pemeriksaan

terhadap bagasi sahaja dilakukan dimeja di belakang mesin

pengimbas kastam, tiada pemeriksaan badan dibuat di kawasan

itu.”

[17] At page 29 ROA Volume 1, the learned trial judge stated:

“Juga, saya mendapati bentuk pembelaan yang dikemukakan

oleh tertuduh itu adalah berbentuk penafian semata. Saya

memutuskan apa yang disampaikan oleh SP1 dan SP3 itu

adalah merupakan kejadian sebenar.”

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[18] With respect, we disagree with the submission. The learned trial

judge had critically examined the evidence of SP1 and SP3 and found

them to be credible and trustworthy witnesses.

[19] On the issue of the discovery of the drugs on his person, the

learned trial judge had concluded that the evidence of SP1 is

consistent with the evidence of SP3. There is no cogent reasons to

reject their evidence. The fact that the impugned drugs was found on

his person when body search was conducted in the narcotics office

was amply supported by the evidence on record. The trial judge had

seen the CCTV recording of the event and concluded that a body

search did not take place at baggage claim area as claimed by the

appellant. The body search was conducted at the office of SP1.

[20] We are satisfied that the learned judge was perfectly correct in

accepting SP1’s evidence. As such, we do not find any error by the

learned trial judge.

[21] In the case of Selvam a/l Arjunan v Public Prosecutor [2012] 4

MLJ 755, it was argued that the credibility of the main witness for the

prosecution SP2 was at stake since he did not prepare a search list.

The Court of Appeal held that the absence of the search list is not fatal

to the prosecution case bearing in mind that the accused was caught

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red handed with the drugs. So too here. The case of the prosecution is

that the appellant was in physical custody and control of the two

packages. They were tied to his right and left calf, respectively. The

evidence against the appellant is overwhelming.

Misdirection

[22] Concerning the appellant’s complaint that the trial judge had

committed error and misdirection of law by relying on direct evidence

and the same time invoking presumption 37(da) of the Act, we are

unable to agree with the submission. Looking at the grounds of

judgment as a whole, we are of the view that the learned trial judge

reached at the correct conclusion. This is what the learned judge

concluded at the end of prosecution’s case at page 18 of ROA Volume

1 :

“Tindakan serta perlakuan tertuduh semasa kejadian jelas

menunjukkan bahawa tertuduh bukan sahaja berada di dalam

milikannya dadah-dadah tersebut, malahan berlakunya

perbuatan mengedar sepertimana yang diperuntukkan di bawah

seksyen 2 Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 yang mentakrifkan

maksud pengedaran. Walau pun ‘milikan’ tidak termasuk di

bawah definasi mengedar, perbuatan tertuduh mengangkut dan

membawa dadah dari satu tempat ke tempat yang lain itu, ia

adalah terjumlah daripada perbuatan mengedar.”

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[23] As regards the issue of trafficking, the trial judge stated as

follows at page 31 of ROA Volume 1:

“Fakta dan keterangan jelas membuktikan bahawa tertuduh

telah mengedarkan dadah jenis Methamphetamine berjumlah

1816.1 gram, secara langsung yang jelas melebihi berat yang

diperuntukkan di bawah seksyen 37(a)(xvi) Akta Dadah

Berbahaya 1952 tersebut.

Juga, terdapat keterangan langsung di dalam kes ini yang

menunjukkan tertuduh melakukan perbuatan pengedaran dadah

sebagaimana yang ditakrifkan di bawah seksyen 2 Akta Dadah

Berbahaya 1952 iaitu mengangkut dan membawa dadah-dadah

tersebut ke Malaysia, bagi tujuan pengedaran.”

[24] The learned trial judge went on to explain at page 33 of ROA

Volume 1:

“… menilai serta menimbang kepada keterangan secara

keseluruhannya, dengan ini mencapai suatu keputusan iaitu

pihak pembelaan diakhir kes pembelaan ini telah gagal

menimbulkan sebarang keraguan yang munasabah terhadap

kes pihak pendakwaan. Tiada keterangan berjaya

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dikemukakan bagi menyangkal kesahihan keterangan pihak

pendakwaan bagi tujuan menimbulkan keraguan yang

munasabah. Sehingga di akhir kes pembelaan ini, jelas

bahawa pihak pendakwaan telah berjaya membuktikan kes

mereka melampaui keraguan yang munasabah.”

[25] We entertain no doubt that the learned trial judge relied on the

direct evidence in concluding that the appellant did engage in drug

trafficking as defined by section 2 of the Act. The learned trail judge did

refer to section 37(da)(xi) of the Act in passing but did not rely on the

said presumption.

Conclusion

[26] On the foregoing reasons, we find that no substantial miscarriage

of justice had occurred to the appellant that would warrant appellate

intervention (see: Sheo Swamp v King Emperor AIR [1934] PC 22;

Reza Malek Zadeh Sahabali v PP [2014] MLRHU 1815, [2014] 3 MLJ

380). There are no appealable errors committed by the trial judge. In

our view, the conviction is safe.

[27] We, therefore, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction

and sentence of the High Court.

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Sgd

(YAACOB BIN HAJI MD. SAM) Judge Court of Appeal Malaysia Dated 10 November 2017 Counsel for the Appellant: Dato’ Rajpal Singh Messrs Rajpal, Firah & Vishnu Advocates & Solicitors No. 42-1A, First Floor Jalan Medan Batu Caves 1 68100 Batu Caves Selangor Darul Ehsan Counsel for the Respondent: Nurshafini binti Mustafha Timbalan Pedakwa Raya Jabatan Peguam Negara Bahagian Perbicaraan & Rayuan Aras 5, No. 45, Lot 4G7, Presint 4, Persiaran Perdana 62100 Putrajaya