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Eurasia Journal of Mathematics, Science & Technology Education, 2007, 3(4), 351-361

Copyright 2007 by MomentE-ISSN: 1305-8223

An Overview of Conceptual ChangeTheories

Gkhan zdemirNide niversitesi, Nide, TURKEY

Douglas B. ClarkArizona State University, AZ, USA

Received 23 December 2006; accepted 19 June 2007

Conceptual change researchers have made significant progress on two prominent but

competing theoretical perspectives regarding knowledge structure coherence. Theseperspectives can be broadly characterized as (1) knowledge-as-theory perspectives and (2)knowledge-as-elements perspectives. These perspectives can be briefly summarized interms of the following questions. Is a students knowledge most accurately represented asa coherent unified framework of theory-like character (e.g., Carey, 1999; Chi, 2005;Ioannides & Vosniadou, 2002; Wellman & Gelman, 1992)? Or is a students knowledgemore aptly considered as an ecology of quasi-independent elements (e.g., Clark, 2006;diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004; Harrison, Grayson, & Treagust, 1999; Linn, Eylon, &Davis, 2004)? In this review, we clarify these two theoretical perspectives and discuss theeducational implications of each. This debate is important because these perspectivesimplicate radically different pathways for curricular design to help students reorganizetheir understandings. Historically, the research literature has predominantly supportedknowledge-as-theory perspectives. After outlining both perspectives, this paper discussesarguments and educational implications that potentially favor the adoption of knowledge-as-elements perspectives

Keywords: Conceptual Change, Conceptual Ecology, Knowledge Structure Coherence

INTRODUCTION

Fundamental research among science educators andcognitive scientists focuses on how people learn scienceand how people apply this knowledge in their daily lives.

Theoretical perspectives on knowledge structurecoherence are fundamental to much of this research.

Researchers have made significant progress on twoprominent but competing broad theoretical perspectivesregarding knowledge structure coherence: (1)knowledge-as-theory perspectives and (2) knowledge-as-elements perspectives. Essentially, is a studentsknowledge most accurately represented as a coherentunified framework of theory-like character (e.g., Carey,

1999; Chi, 2005; Ioannides & Vosniadou, 2002;Wellman & Gelman, 1992)? Or is a students knowledgemore aptly considered as an ecology of quasi-independent elements (e.g., Clark, 2006; diSessa,Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004; Harrison, Grayson, &

Treagust, 1999; Linn, Eylon, & Davis, 2004)? Recently,diSessa (2006) organized an excellent review of the

historical development in the conceptual changeliterature along this division. In our review, we clarifythe theoretical perspectives and discuss the educationalimplications of each.

The descriptions of the two theoretical positionspresented above are simplifications of the actualperspectives, which are considerably more nuanced as aresult of substantial research and ongoing debateamongst their respective proponents. Proponents ofknowledge-as-theory perspectives, for example, do notargue that students knowledge is theory-like in thesame fashion as the knowledge of scientists (e.g.,

including the scientists awareness of the nature of their

Correspondence to: Gkhan zdemir, PhD.,Nide niversitesi, Eitim Fakltesi, lkretim Blm,Fen Bilgisi Eitimi ABD, 51200, Nide, Turkey

E-mail:[email protected]


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G. zdemir & D.B.Clark

352 2007 Moment,Eurasia J. Math. Sci. & Tech. Ed., 3(4), 351-361

theories or the scientists ability to engage in hypothesistesting with regard to their theories). These proponentsdo argue, however, for an overarching hierarchicalconceptual structure with theory-like properties thatconstrains a students interpretation of subordinatemodels and ideas. Similarly, the knowledge-as-elementsperspectives should not be incorrectly caricatured as the

random interaction of independent elements. Rather,elements interact with each other in an emergentmanner where the combinatorial complexity of thesystem constrains students interpretations ofphenomenon. While the researchers in each camp also

vary along other important issues (e.g., conceptual grain-size, ages of students, methods, and scientific contentareas) this debate remains highly visible and contested.

The importance of the debate is critical because thesemodels implicate radically different pathways forcurricular design to help students reorganize theirunderstandings.

KNOWLEDGE-AS-THEORY PERSPECTIVES

Piagetian learning theory has influenced manyresearchers of knowledge-as-theory perspectives.Studies of the philosophy and history of science havealso influenced many of these researchers. To explain aconceptual shift, proponents of knowledge-as-theoryperspectives often present analogies between Piagetsconcepts of assimilation and accommodation andKuhns (1962) concepts of normal science and scientificrevolution (e.g., Carey, 1985, 1999; Wiser & Carey,

1983). While some of these researchers have explainedconceptual change in terms of framework theories andmental models (e.g., Vosniadou, 1994; Vosniadou &Brewer, 1992), others have focused on higher levelontological shifts (Chi, 1992). The following sectionprovides an overview of the core conceptual changeresearch related to knowledge-as-theory perspectives.

Research on Conceptual Change byAssimilation and Accommodation

One of the most prominent conceptual change

theories, which correspond to Kuhns notion of aparadigm shift or Piagets notion of accommodation,

was defined by Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog(1982). They proposed that if a learners currentconception is functional and if the learner can solveproblems within the existing conceptual schema, thenthe learner does not feel a need to change the currentconception. Even when the current conception does notsuccessfully solve some problems, the learner may makeonly moderate changes to his or her conceptions. This iscalled conceptual capture (Hewson, 1981) or weakrestructuring (Carey, 1985). In such cases, the

assimilations go on without any need for

accommodation. It is believed that the learner must bedissatisfied with an initial conception in order toabandon it and accept a scientific conception forsuccessful conceptual change. This more radical changeis called conceptual exchange (Hewson, 1981) orradical restructuring (Carey, 1985). According toPosner et al. (1982), the scientific conception must also

be intelligible, plausible, and fruitful for successfulconceptual change to occur. Intelligible means that thenew conception must be clear enough to make sense tothe learner. Plausible means the new conception mustbe seen as plausibly true. Fruitful means the newconception must appear potentially productive to thelearner for solving current problems. Posner et al.sperspective assumes that these cognitive conditionsshould be met during the learning process for asuccessful conceptual change. The major goal is tocreate a cognitive conflict to make a learner dissatisfied

with his or her existing conception. Then, the learner

may accept a normative view as intelligible, plausible,and fruitful. This view has been very influential theoryto determine a learners specific conceptions that resultfrom the interaction between beliefs and knowledge ofthe learner.

Posner et al. (1982) embed their explanation ofconceptual change within a conceptual ecologyperspective. According to Posner et al., a learnersconceptual ecology consists of their conceptions andideas rooted in their epistemological beliefs. Thisconceptual ecology perspective has proven veryinfluential. Even though Posner et al.s primarymechanism for conceptual change has been rejected bymany proponents of knowledge-as-elementsperspectives, many knowledge-as-elements (as well asmany knowledge-as-theory proponents) have adoptedthis larger conceptual ecology architecture into theirperspectives. From a conceptual ecology perspective,the constituent ideas, ontological categories, andepistemological beliefs highly influence a learnersinteractions with new ideas and problems.Misconceptions are therefore not only inaccuratebeliefs; misconceptions organize and constrain learningin a manner similar to paradigms in science. In other

words, prior conceptions are highly resistant to changebecause concepts are not independent from thecognitive artifacts within a learners conceptual ecology.Some concepts are attached to others and they generatethoughts and perceptions. Because of this web-basedrelationship between concepts, a revision to a conceptrequires revisions to others. Thus, Strike and Posner(1992) advocate that:

This theory of conceptual change is embedded in a setof epistemological assumptions that are far moregeneralizable than our application to misconceptionshas exploited. These epistemological assumptions

suggest that the basic problem of understanding


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Conceptual Change

2007 Moment,Eurasia J. Math. Sci. & Tech. Ed., 3(4), 351-361 353

cognitive development is to understand how thecomponents of an individuals conceptual ecologyinteract and develop and how the conceptual ecologyinteracts with experience (p. 155-156).

Research on the Incommensurability of Adultsand Childrens Concepts

Another area of research that supports knowledge-as-theory perspectives focuses on the notion that adultsand childrens concepts are each coherent butincommensurable with one another (Carey, 1985). Inother words, people maintain coherent theory-likeunderstandings of concepts. Change between conceptscan be achieved, according to Carey (1991), throughthree processes: replacement, differentiation, andcoalescence. In replacement, one concept displacesanother concept, where the two concepts arefundamentally different; it is an overwrite procedure.

Differentiation is another process in which the initialconcept splits into two or more new concepts such asdog differentiated into the more specific terms collieand terrier. Coalescence is the opposite process ofdifferentiation; Coalescence involves two or moreoriginal concepts coalescing into a single concept, suchas collie and terrier into the more general category ofdog.

Research on Gradual Transformations of NaveTheories

While the term revolutionary evokes the idea ofinstantaneous change, recent research supports gradualtransformations in conceptual change. Carey (1999)proposes such a view in terms of childrens navebiological theories. She proposes that conceptual changecannot be thought of as global restructuring asdescribed by Piaget. Rather, conceptual change shouldbe thought of as domain specific restructurings.

According to this view, children restructure their navetheory structures by increasing their knowledge in aspecific domain. As children are exposed to newexperiences and instruction, they gradually replace their

theory-like conceptual structures with scientificallycorrect conceptual structures. These restructuringsresult from the childs increased knowledge of a domain,social interactions, and a variety of disequilibratinginfluences, partially resulting from the development ofthe logical structures of the child.

According to Carey, concepts and beliefs are the twoprimary components of intuitive knowledge. Beliefs arethe relational pieces that connect concepts. Forexample, people are animals refers to two differentconcepts, people and animals. She argues that whilechanges in relations between the concepts are relatively

easy, changes in the concepts are thorny processesbecause intuitive theories constrain the concepts in

which beliefs are formed. Therefore, conceptual changeis a gradual process that occurs at the level of individualconcepts.

Hatano and Inagaki (1996) focus on nave theoriesof children within biological concepts. Their view isconsistent with that of Carey (1999), that youngchildren, before being taught in school, possess a fairly

well-developed body of biological knowledge thatenables them to make consistent predictions andexplanations regarding biological phenomena. Naveknowledge is constructed through daily experiences atearly ages and formal biology is constructed from navebiology through the restructuring of it.

Research on Mental Models, FrameworkTheories, and Ontological Shifts

Several researchers focus on conceptual changeprocesses in terms of mental models (e.g., Ioannides &

Vosniadou, 2002; Linder, 1993; McCloskey, 1983;Smith, Blakeslee, & Anderson, 1993; Vosniadou, 1994;

Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). Vosniadou and Ioannides(1998), for example, explore spontaneous changes andinstruction-based changes at the mental model level.Spontaneous change is change that occurs in youngchildren without specific instruction through theenrichment of observations and other kinds of learning,such as language learning. This position is very similarto Careys (1999) argument that even very youngchildren develop theories and make predictions aboutphenomena. Their causal explanations reflect

ontological commitments that are subject to revisionand radical change. Instruction-based change focuses onthe evolution of childrens mental models through theintroduction of formal scientific instruction. Instructionleads children to construct synthetic mental models thatare still inconsistent with the scientific theory. However,these synthetic mental models imply that students beginto synthesize the scientific theory with their initialtheory. They make changes in their beliefs based on theinstruction of an authority figure, but they still lack thefull scientific theory due to their ontological andepistemological commitments.

This development of synthetic models reveals thatontological commitments must be changed in order tofully restructure a students framework theory. Thus,akin to Careys opinion, Vosniadou claims thatchildrens generation of scientific models is constrainedby their framework theories. For example, elementaryschool students in Vosniadou and Brewers (1992)sample consistently constructed the Earth models indisc or rectangular flat shape based on their everydayexperience. Vosniadou and Brewer called these initialmodels because they are not affected by the scientificmodel of the Earth. However, older students

constructed some synthetic Earth models (Dual Earth,


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hollow sphere, and flattened sphere) influenced by thespherical shape of the Earth from instruction.

Vosniadou and Brewer suggested that in the formationof these mental models, students beliefs about theEarth based on their observations and culturalinfluences are constrained by a nave framework ofpresuppositions (Vosniadou, 1994).

Two of the presuppositions of the framework theoryare particularly important because they have thepotential to explain the formation of the initial andsynthetic models of the Earth children construct. Theyare: (a) the presupposition that space is organized interms of the directions of up and down with respect toa flat ground, and (b) the presupposition thatunsupported objects fall in a downward direction. Theassumption that children are operating under theconstraints of these two presuppositions can explainthe formation of the initial and synthetic models of theEarth obtained in our sample (p. 55).

According to Vosniadou (1994), students generatemisconceptions or synthetic mental models thatcombine aspects of the scientific model with their initialmodels within the constraints of their frameworktheories. The presuppositions of the framework theoryneed to be revised and eventually replaced to allow forthe scientific model.

The framework theory perspective is consistent withChis (1992) argument that conceptual change requiresan ontological shift. Chi (1992) believes that theconceptual change process is hard because either (a) thestudent assigns the concept to a different ontologicalcategory from the scientific one or (b) the student lacksan appropriate category to which the concept could beassigned. If students become aware of their ontologicalcommitments, they can then become aware of how thescientific theory does not fit with their existingknowledge structure. In turn, they can assign theconcept into a correct category by revising theirontological commitments, categories, andpresuppositions.

Researchers of these perspectives emphasize thatradical changes like these do not take place suddenly.Rather, they involve gradual and time-consumingprocesses because the student must revise andrestructure an entire network of beliefs andpresuppositions. While Chis argument focusesspecifically on changing ontological categories,

Vosniadou and Ioannides (1998) suggest thatontological change is only one of the changes requiredin the process of changing theories. As students slowlyrevise their initial conceptual system over time byadding the elements of scientific explanation, studentsshould be guided through instruction to create largertheoretical constructions with greater explanatorypower.

Summary and Synthesis of Knowledge-as-Theory Perspectives

In summary, knowledge-as-theory perspectiveshypothesize theory-like nave knowledge structures.

This theory-like knowledge is hypothesized to involvecoherent structures grounded in persistent ontological

and epistemological commitments. Because novicesunconsciously develop these coherent structuresthrough collections of daily experiences, their theoriesare not available for hypothesis testing in a mannersimilar to scientists theories. However, novicesalternative conceptions do constrain future learning andallow novices to make consistent predictions acrossconceptual domains. Knowledge-as-theory perspectiveshypothesize revolutionary change in knowledgestructures through various mechanisms. Someresearchers frame their conceptual change theories interms of Piagets notion of assimilation and

accommodation or Kuhns notion of a paradigm shift.Some researchers explain conceptual change in terms ofthe notion of incommensurability demonstrating thedistinction between the roots of the concepts. Otherresearchers propose ontological shifts and the evolutionof mental models. Although these knowledge-as-theoryperspectives have developed in different domains, suchas force and motion (McCloskey, 1983), astronomy(Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992), biology (Carey, 1999), andheat and temperature (Wiser & Carey, 1983), they allassert that learners at any given time maintain a smallnumber of well-developed coherent nave theories based

on their everyday experiences and that these theorieshave explanatory power to make consistent predictionsand explanations across significant domains.

KNOWLEDGE-AS-ELEMENTSPERSPECTIVES

While the aforementioned knowledge-as-theoryperspectives on conceptual change process have widesupport within the science education community,several researchers have proposed opposingperspectives that characterize students understanding in

terms of collections of multiple quasi-independentelements (e.g., Brown, 1995; Clark, 2006; diSessa, 1988,1993; Hunt & Minstrell, 1994; Linn, Eylon, & Davis,2004). Anderson (1993) and Thagard (1992) providerelatively mechanical/mathematical examples of thisperspective. Clark (2006), diSessa, Gillespie, and Esterly(2004), Hunt and Minstrell (1994), and Linn, Eylon, andDavis (2004) maintain more organic perspectives thatfocus on collections of elements including, but notlimited to, phenomenological primitives, facts, facets,narratives, concepts, and mental models at variousstages of development and sophistication. diSessa

focuses more on the nature of the elements, Clark


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focuses on longitudinal processes of change, Minstrellfocuses on the facets student use in the classroom, andLinn focuses on the process through which studentsreorganize, revise, and connect these elements. Learningoccurs through a process of restructuring andreorganizing these ideas.

diSessas perspective is the most well known of the

knowledge-as-elements perspectives. diSessa (1993)proposes that the knowledge structures of novicesconsist primarily of unstructured collections of manysimple elements that he calls p-prims(phenomenological primitives). P-prims are developedthrough a sense-of-mechanism that reflects ourinteractions with the physical world such as pushing,pulling, throwing, and holding. The learner merelyassumes that something happens because thats the

way things are (diSessa, 1993, p. 112). These implicitpresuppositions influence learners reasoning when theyinterpret the world (Ueno, 1993). P-prims do not have

the status of a theory because they are not produced oractivated under a highly organized system like theframework theories proposed by knowledge-as-theoryperspectives. These p-prims are generated from alearners experiences, observations, and abstractions ofphenomena. Individual p-prims are loosely connectedinto larger conceptual networks. diSessa describes cuingpriority, reliability priority, and structured priorities topropose how those p-prims are recognized andactivated according to context.

Some recent empirical evidence supports diSessasargument. Southerland, Abrams, Cummins, and

Anzelmod (2001) explored the nature of studentsbiological knowledge structure. They concluded that p-prims have more explanatory power than conceptualframeworks theory regarding the shifting nature of

students conceptions of biological phenomena. Clarks(2006) longitudinal study in thermodynamics stronglysuggests that students understanding of heat andtemperature can be explained through a relatedelemental perspective. In the domain of force, zdemirand Clark (in preparation) investigated knowledgestructures of students from kindergarten to high school

and found that students knowledge structures were bestdescribed in terms of knowledge-as-elementsperspectives.

Summary and Synthesis of Knowledge-as-Elements Perspectives

In summary, knowledge-as-elements perspectiveshypothesize that nave knowledge structures consist ofmultiple conceptual elements including, but not limitedto, phenomenological primitives, facts, facets,narratives, concepts, and mental models at various

stages of development and sophistication. Novicesspontaneously connect and activate these knowledgepieces according to the relevance of the situation.During the conceptual change process, the elements andinteractions between the elements are revised andrefined through addition, elimination, andreorganization to strengthen the network. From thisperspective, conceptual change involves a piecemealevolutionary process rather than a broad theory-replacement process.

COMPARISON OF THE TWO VIEWS

There are significant similarities and differencesbetween knowledge-as-theory and knowledge-as-elements perspectives. Table 1 provides a summary of

Table 1. Summary Comparison of Knowledge-as-Elements and Knowledge-as-Theory Perspectives.

Agreements

Learners acquire knowledge from their daily experiences.Learners nave knowledge influences their formal learning.Much nave knowledge is highly resistant to change. Thus, conceptual change is a time consuming process.

Disagreements

Knowledge-as-Theory Perspectives Knowledge-as-Elements PerspectivesNave knowledge is highly organized in theory,schema, or frame forms.

Nave knowledge is a collection of quasi-independentknowledge elements.

Nave knowledge in a coherent form has explanatorypower to consistently interpret the situations acrossbroad domains.

Consistent application over time for individual contexts,and systematicities will be present, but high contextualsensitivity.

More focus on revolutionary replacement of naveknowledge in a manner similar to Kuhns perspectiveson paradigms in science. Significant coherencebetween ideas at any given point in time.

More focus on conceptual change involvingevolutionary revision, refinement, and reorganization.Multiple conflicting ideas may coexist simultaneously atany given point in time.

Explanations involve the creation of mental modelsconstrained through the overarching framework

theories or ontological categories.

Explanations involve the p-prims and other elementswithin the learners conceptual ecology that are most

strongly cued by the context.


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some of these key similarities and differences. Thesubsequent sections provide further discussion andclarifications of these agreements and disagreements.

Agreements

Obviously, there are significant areas of agreement

and overlap between the two perspectives. We firstoutline and discuss some of these areas of similarity andlater discuss some of the core differences.

Learners acquire knowledge from their dailyexperiences. Both perspectives agree that novicesconceptual knowledge is heavily influenced by everydayexperiences with natural phenomena and events.

Therefore, novices explanations often includescientifically non-normative explanations based on theirdaily experiences. In order to teach normative scientifictheories and concepts, we have to know what studentsthink and then adjust instruction accordingly.

Learners nave knowledge influences their formallearning. In addition to influencing their causalexplanations, students prior knowledge influences theirformal learning. Students come to formal scienceinstruction with a diverse set of alternative conceptionsor misconceptions concerning natural phenomena andevents. These alternative conceptions of phenomenaand events are often incompatible with scientificallynormative ones. Knowledge-as-theory perspectivessuggest that if core framework theories can beinfluenced through instruction, misconceptions will bereplaced as changes to the framework theory revision

ripple outward through the rest of the connectedframework. Knowledge-as-elements perspectives viewmisconceptions as individual components that requirerevision and refinement to connect more productively

with a more normative conceptual framework. Henceelemental perspectives tend to suggest a bottom-upapproach rather than a top-down approach.

Much nave knowledge is resistant to change. Much naveknowledge is highly resistant to change by conventionalteaching strategies because of its entrenchment ineveryday experiences. A number of studies report thatstudents still maintain certain alternative conceptions in

spite of substantial instruction.

Disagreements

While there are important similarities in thepredictions and expectations of the two perspectives,there are, however, also significant differences betweenthe perspectives. We now outline and discuss some ofthe most critical differences.

Differences in structural properties of nave knowledge. Thefirst difference between the two perspectives is aboutthe structure of nave knowledge. From knowledge-as-

theory perspectives, nave knowledge is highly organized

into theory, schema, or frame forms. The root of thistheory comes from Piagets early work and has beenstrengthened by the similarities between early scientistsknowledge structure and nave knowledge structure. Inother words, knowledge-as-theory perspectivesanalogize nave conceptions to nave theories. On theother hand, knowledge-as-elements perspectives

propose that naive knowledge is a collection of quasi-independent simple elements within a larger conceptualecology that are loosely connected into largerconceptual networks without an overarching structure.Knowledge-as-elements perspectives therefore predict(1) consistent application of ideas over time forindividual contexts along with definite systematicitiesbut (2) high contextual sensitivity. Knowledge-as-elements perspectives also predict that individuals maysimultaneously maintain multiple conflicting ideas on aregular basis.

Dispute about consistency vs. inconsistency. Another

difference between the two perspectives focuses on thedomain size across which a novices predictions andexplanations should be consistent. According toknowledge-as-theory perspectives, fundamentalpresuppositions, ontological and epistemologicalcommitments, (e.g., heavy objects fall faster) areembedded in nave theories and students explanationsare constrained by them. Therefore, a nave theoryguides a novice to make consistent predictions andcausal explanations across multiple contexts spanningbroad domains (that may or may not parallel thedomains of related normative concepts). Furthermore,

there should be much coherence between ideas. On theother hand, from knowledge-as-elements perspectives,novices knowledge structures are much morecontextually sensitive. A novices predictions orexplanations will be consistent for specific relatedcontexts over time, but this consistency doesnt extendacross broad domains because of the contextualsensitivity of the constituent elements and cuingrelationships. Therefore, while there will be localsystematicities in novices predictions and explanations,knowledge-as-elements perspectives suggest thatnovices will not demonstrate consistency across broad

domains.Revolutionary vs. Evolutionary change. A third important

difference between the perspectives focuses on thenature of change processes. Knowledge-as-theoryperspectives often suggest revolutionary change wherecurrent concepts are abandoned and replaced withnormative concepts. According to knowledge-as-theoryperspectives, novices already have extensive well-defined theoretical structure from the beginning.Novices need to add new knowledge elements into theexisting conceptual structure and/or modify the existingknowledge elements of their conceptual structure in

order to replace their initial theory with the scientific


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one. The change is basically defined as holistic anddramatic, although many theorists acknowledge that theprocess is often time consuming and lengthy. Theimportant idea is that revolutionary change occursbetween distinct understandings or models that aretheory-like in character. Thus, there should besignificant coherence between ideas at any point along

the change process.Knowledge-as-elements perspectives propose a more

evolutionary trajectory without such distinct phases orstages. Learning involves the gradual accretion andpiecemeal eliminations, additions, and organization ofelemental knowledge pieces where multiplecontradictory ideas can coexist within a studentsconceptual ecology. Knowledge-as-elements perspec-tives suggest that the knowledge-forming process begins

with quasi-independent small knowledge elements thatget connected to create more complex (hopefully morenormative) conceptual structures by adding new

knowledge elements, reorganizing connections, and/ormodifying existing simple knowledge elements throughan evolutionary process. This contrasts with knowledge-as-theory perspectives that suggest revolutionaryprocesses of conceptual change where one theory-likeunderstanding is replaced by another theory-likeunderstanding.

Empirical Evidence for Conceptual ChangeTheories

Historically, the research literature has

predominantly leaned toward knowledge-as-theoryperspectives (diSessa, 2006; Driver, 1989). We nowdiscuss arguments and educational implications thatpotentially support the adoption of knowledge-as-elements perspectives. In particular, we now presentsome recent research findings on knowledge structurecoherence that lead us to lean toward the knowledge-as-elements perspective. First we discuss a series of studiesand replication studies by Ioannides and Vosniadou(2002), diSessa, Gillespie, and Esterly (2004), andzdemir and Clark (in preparation). We then presentdata from several other related studies.

Ioannides and Vosniadou (2002) investigated themeaning of force and its development among 105children across four age levels. What they found wasthat 88.6% of the subjects responses fell into sevencategories of internally consistent interpretations offorce. The seven categories include: (a) internal force,(b) internal force affected by movement, (c) internal andacquired force, (d) acquired force, (e) acquired force andforce of push/pull, (f) force of push/pull, and (g)gravitational and other forces. For example, a student

with internal force meanings always explained that forceis related to an objects size or weight. The students in

this study thus made consistent predictions and gave

consistent explanations regardless of context. Therefore,the Ioannides and Vosniadou concluded the studentsinterpretations of force were uniform and internallyconsistent.

diSessa et al. (2004) conducted a quasi-replicationand extension of the Ioannides and Vosniadou study.diSessa et al. found that students meaning of force

could not be explained by the coherence claim.Students responses were inconsistent across contexts,even in the replication part of the study. The results ofthe study also support several alternative explanations in

which the learners understanding of force is context-dependent. The findings supported earlier worksuggesting that nave knowledge consists ofunstructured small pieces that are unconsciouslyactivated in certain circumstances (diSessa, 1993).Indeed, even the color of an object could affect theexplanations of kindergarten students in responding thequestions of force.

The conflicting findings between the Ioannides andVosniadou (2002) study and diSessa et al.s quasi-replication (2004) suggested the need for furtherclarification. Recently, zdemir and Clark (inpreparation) conducted a replication study with four agegroups of Turkish students to resolve the coherence vs.fragmentation dispute about students understanding offorce. The study applied the coding schemes based onboth Ioannides and Vosniadou (2002) and diSessa et al.(2004). The results of the study suggest that studentsinterpretation of force supports knowledge-as-elementsperspectives overall. The results of this study also

indicate that methodological flaws such as employingsoft coding schemes and assessing studentsunderstanding of force in limited number of contextscan overestimate students knowledge coherence. Evensmall contextual variations may affect studentsinterpretations of force and, thus, this causesfragmentation in their causal responses.

In addition to this series of replications and quasi-replications, several other recent studies investigatingthe debate have provided further support forknowledge-as-elements perspectives. First among these,Southerland, Abrams, Cummins, and Anzelmod (2001)

explored the nature of students biological knowledgestructure. They concluded that p-prims have moreexplanatory power than conceptual frameworks theoryregarding the shifting nature of students conceptions ofbiological phenomena. Second, diSessa, Elby, andHammer (2002) documented contradictory claims andexplanations for the same situation in differentoccasions in the domain of force and motion. Third,

Thaden-Koach, Dufresne, and Mestre (2006)investigated fifty college students understanding aboutmoving objects by using coordination class theory(diSessa & Sherin, 1998). The result of the study

highlights the contextual sensitivity. Thus, they


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concluded that learning in a domain like physics is acomplex endeavor requiring considerable time,instructional resources, and appreciation of thecomplexity of applying ideas across diverse contexts (p.10). Fourth, Wagners (2006) case study analysissuggests that students conceptual understanding isoften highly context sensitive and that transfer therefore

requires the acquisition of abstract representations bymeans of the incremental refinement of knowledgeresources that account for-rather than overlook-contextual variation (p.1). Finally, Clarks (2006)longitudinal study in thermodynamics showed thatstudents explanations evidenced multiple contradictoryideas, disruptive experientially supported ideas,difficulties productively connecting normative ideas, andthe active pursuit of idiosyncratic explanations. Thatstudy demonstrates that students understanding ofthermal equilibrium evolve from disjointed sets ofcontext-dependent ideas toward, if not achieving,

integration, normatively, and cohesiveness (p. 467).Therefore, although researchers are still debating this

issue and there is not yet consensus on knowledgestructure coherence and the mechanisms of conceptualchange, our view aligns more closely with theknowledge-as-elements perspective because of theresults of these recent studies.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTRUCTION

The implications of these disputes for instruction areprofound. Determining whether students intuitive

knowledge consists of many quasi-independentelements, as suggested by knowledge-as-elementsperspectives, or of a network of theories, as suggestedby knowledge-as-theory perspectives, is critical; it affectsour understanding of the conceptual change process,curriculum design, and instructional strategies. If alearners understanding is theory-like, and if certainspecific conditions are met, the learner will becomedissatisfied with existing conceptions when conflictingexamples are introduced to the learner (Strike & Posner,1982). It is believed that such conceptual conflict couldmake the learner abandon existing misconceptions and

accept scientifically appropriate alternatives if thelearner could not otherwise dismiss, ignore, orreinterpret them within the existing framework (Chinn& Brewer, 1993). On the other hand, if a learnersintuitive knowledge is elemental in nature, instructionshould focus on how those elements are activated inappropriate contexts. Teachers may first make studentsaware of their central pieces of knowledge and thenallow students to use them in appropriate contexts.From this perspective, productive curriculum designmight confront students with the same phenomena indifferent contexts. The curriculum would therefore

focus more on a refinement processes including

addition, modification, elimination, and organization ofthe knowledge elements in learners knowledge structureover time.

From a constructivist view, all of the variouselements in a students conceptual network are subjectto progressive knowledge construction. School scienceoften conflicts with students intuitive knowledge. If we

merely target students misconceptions withreplacement procedure as suggested by radicalrevolutionary models, we might only achieve thesereplacements in a limited number of contexts whichmight remain independent of students interpretationsof experiences outside of the classroom. Therefore weshould attempt to help students reorganize andreprioritize the elements and connections of theirconceptual network if we want to allow students toconstruct a scientific theory that is applicable to anumber of situations. This cognitive process cannot beachieved by interpreting students knowledge structures

with small number of mental representations orconceptual schemes.

Because constructivism sees students existing ideasas a primary source for learning, erasing misconceptions

with a replacement model is at odds with this paradigm.In their paper, Smith, diSessa, and Roschelle (1993)extensively discuss how traditional view onmisconceptions and the process of conceptual changeare at odds with constructivism:

Our central claim is that many of the assertions ofmisconceptions research are inconsistent withconstructivism. Misconceptions research has

emphasized the flawed results of student learning.Constructivism, in contrast, characterizes the processof learning as the gradual recrafting of existingknowledge that, despite many intermediate difficulties,is eventually successful. It is difficult to see howmisconceptions that (a) interfere with learning (b)must be replaced, and (c) resist instruction can alsoplay role of useful prior knowledge that supportsstudents learning. If we take constructivism seriously,we must either reconsider the solely mistakencharacter of misconceptions or look for other ideas toserve as productive resources for student learning(p.123-124).

When we look at conceptual change from diSessasepistemological stance, we should attempt to helpstudents reorganize and reprioritize the elements andconnections of their conceptual network. P-prims suchas force as mover, dying away and spontaneousresistance describe the events in the physical world interms of intuitive conceptualization (diSessa, 1993). Theidea is that these p-prims should be cued in severalappropriate contexts to build more complex and stableformal knowledge. In this case, p-prims within thestudents alternative conceptions take a function toserve as productive tools for expertise. For example, the

function of the dying away conception can be invoked


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as part of formal concepts and learning (diSessa, 2006).In a simple event, tossing a ball into the air, studentsnaturally recognize that the motion of the ball eventuallydies away. This knowledge element is often selfexplanatory in the sense that there is no need to explainthe cause of the event. However, if the causality behinda novices explanation is investigated, the novice most

probably raises the concept of gravity. Novices mightsay that the upward force on the ball is decreased bygravity until a balance occurs between the upward forceand gravity at the peak in the air. Although this causalityis non-normative, it provides extremely useful buildingblocks for the process of refining a studentsunderstanding of the concept of conservation of energyand the concept of momentum in science.

In terms of specific instructional strategies,knowledge-as-elements perspectives suggest thatconceptual change requires restructuring, editing, andorganizing rather than discrete changes from one

conception to another especially for complex and richdomains such as mechanics and thermodynamics.

Toward this goal, engaging students with multiplecomputational representations suggests great promisefor instruction. More specifically, instruction engagingmultiple representations can re-represent concepts inmultiple ways to highlight specific variables within eachcontext separately while ignoring the others (Ainsworth,1999). The complexity of a phenomenon can besimplified to help a learner focus on the specific aspectsof the phenomenon across multiple contexts. Parnafes(submitted) investigated students learning processes

about physical phenomena through computationalrepresentation. Her research was grounded upon aknowledge-as-elements perspective. Her analysessuggested that (1) instruction engaging multiplerepresentations can highlight the important aspects ofphenomena so that a learner can easily see anddifferentiate between them, (2) instruction engagingmultiple representations can help students identifyfragmentation in their causal responses and encouragestudents to engage in conflict resolution and coherence-building between ideas, and (3) instruction engagingmultiple computational representations can provide

interactive visual aids for the investigation ofphenomena. Therefore, while multiple instructionalstrategies can offer synergistic benefits, instructionengaging multiple computational representations seemsparticularly powerful from knowledge-as-elementsperspectives.

FINAL THOUGHTS

In our review, we have outlined key features ofknowledge-as-elements and knowledge-as-theoryperspectives. There is likely no single truth to explain

the complex processes of conceptual change and nave

knowledge structure. One possibility is that the degreeof the richness of a scientific domain might be anindicator to decide which theory is more useful fordescribing and analyzing conceptual change. Forexample, diSessa developed his knowledge-as-elementsperspectives for the rich domain of mechanics while

Vosniadous knowledge-as-theory perspectives were

developed in domains with which students have lessfirst-hand interaction (e.g., astronomy).

A key issue to consider is that students learningprocesses and trajectories may involve periods andaspects of both coherence and transition. Fewer andfewer researchers currently espouse radical knowledge-as-theory perspectives. Wiser and Amin (2001) forexample suggest that conceptual change involves bothrevolutionary as well as evolutionary components.Similarly, Susan Carey suggests that both strong and

weak restructuring occurs and that the process takestime. Stella Vosniadou also agrees that the process takes

time and that students may temporarily embracemultiple synthetic models between stages. At thesame time, diSessa and others are currently working onresearch about coordination classes to explainsystematicities and connections between ideas ratherthan focusing predominantly on the quasi-independenceof the various elements. There is therefore aconvergence toward the center of these perspectives inorder to account for coherence, systematicity, andtransition.

Ultimately, knowledge-as-elements perspectives mayprove most useful because they provide more tools with

which to interpret times of transition in studentsunderstanding even if students initial understandings(and even intermediate stages) are indeed theory-like innature. The knowledge-as-theory perspectives discussedabove acknowledge that conceptual change may takeextended periods of time, but they generally provide lessdetail about the mechanisms for these transitions. Toolsfor explaining and modeling transitional times arecritical, because these transitional times may extendacross many school grades and on into adulthood.

Therefore, although there are strong arguments fromknowledge-as-theory perspectives regarding the theory-

like understandings of young children, for example interms of a nave biology (e.g., Inagaki & Hatano, 2002;Carey, 1999) or even astronomy (e.g., Vosniadou &Brewer, 1994), the arguments are much less strong forolder students. Ioannides and Vosniadou (2002) forexample, present data that is compelling regarding thecoherence of younger students understanding about theconcept of force, but that study presents less compellingdata regarding the coherence of older studentsunderstandings, which can only be grouped into a catch-all category of gravity and other. Older studentsunderstandings therefore seem much more transitional

and fragmented. This transition has been shown to


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extend well into adulthood, if not permanently. Clarks(2006) longitudinal study of students understanding ofthermodynamics tracked students from eighth gradethrough twelfth grade and showed ongoing transitionacross these years. Therefore, even if for the sake ofargument we accept that young students exhibit naveknowledge with theory-like attributes, the strongest

argument for knowledge-as-elements perspectives maybe that it can account both for coherent phases as wellas transitional phases while knowledge-as theory-perspectives focus primarily on phases of the processthat appear much more ephemeral after the early years.

Authors Note

We would like to acknowledge Cynthia DAngelo forher help in editing the final version of this manuscript.

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