UMinho HRI 11 Cuba Crisis Distr

8/8/2019 UMinho HRI 11 Cuba Crisis Distr

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Crise dos msseis de Cuba:o contexto

A 1 dcada ps-guerra acabou

com a formao de dois blocosO resto dos pases fora ou

dentro dos mesmos blocos tem que considerar esse facto

A oposio dos blocos:

motivos ideolgicos geopolticos


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Armas nucleares

Falta de conscincia relativamente ao seupoder destrutivo

Facilidade na transio das iniciativaspacficas, as ameaas e ultimatos

Como resultado: instabilidade do sistemainternacional, tenso

Normalidade das crises: em frica, sia,Amrica Latina

Ao mesmo tempo, proliferao da prticadas negociaes


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Os EUANEW LOOK (1953)

Financiamento para armamento nuclear Reduo do contingente dos EUA na Europa:

os EUA no precisam sustentar um exrcitogrande na Europa; basta s aumentar no onmero de cargas nucleares e os meios detransporte para elas


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Os EUAMASSIVE RETALIATION (1954) Instrumento da presso psicolgica

Cada caso da expanso comunista deve ter uma resposta:Retaliate instantly and by means of our choosing Tambm no caso de ataque limitado/reduzido, aplicar toda a fora do

potencial nuclear (para prevenir aces futuras nesse sentido) Possibilidade da escalada do conflito vertical (strategy of rapid

escalation) Um conflito ocasional podia-se transformar numa guerra com uso dearmas nucleares

O risco envolvido Desde o Outono 1949, a URSS uma potncia nuclear

em Agosto 1953, testada a bomba de hidrognio (bomba H, nos EUAdesde 1952)

1954: bombardeiros intercontinentais, com a capacidade de atingir oterritrio dos EUA via Plo de Norte e regressar

Mesmo assim, os EUA continuavam com a supremacia na quantidade de

carga nuclear e os meios de transporte


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DobryninEX-COM


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Cuba

Situao geogrfica: 150 km daFlorida

Vive sob a tutela econmica

dos EUA, que a possuem abase de Guantanamo 80% das exportaes :

acar -EUA Ditadura de Batista, contra quem

luta Fidel Castro Luta armada, alcana grande

popularidade

Antiga possesso espanhola, politicamenteindependente desde a guerra hispano-americanade 1898


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Crise dos msseis de Cuba

A evoluo do regime de Fidel Castro,instalado em Janeiro de 1959

A aproximao URSS, ligada saspiraes de Castro de fazer sair

Cuba do alcance dos EUA Em Julho 1960, Che Guevara (prximo

a F.Castro) anuncia publicamente queCuba pertence ao bloco socialista


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Os EUA consideram isso uma afronta

doutrina Monroe e Kennedy decideintervir

Out 1960:

suspendem a ajuda financeira

cortam as relaes diplomticas

suspendem a importao de acar

a imagem dos EUA


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Activismo dos refugiados cubanos(Florida, prxima a Cuba), comea

exercer presso sobre Kennedy

contribui para o aumento da tensoentre os pases


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Organizao dos Estados

Americanos (OEA) Maro 1961 Com o objectivo de fortalecer os

regimes anticomunistas na AmricaLatina e de isolar Cuba,

Kennedy instala a Organizao dosEstados Americanos (OEA) + um vasto programa de auxlio, a

Aliana para o Progresso Cuba participa (Guevara), mas no

assina a Carta Imagem dos EUA


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Abril de 1961: Baa dos Porcos O desembarque de 1500 cubanos anti-

castristas apoiados pelos americanos,na Baa dos Porcos

revela-se um fracasso (derrotados em48 h)

Preparao fraca


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IMPLICAES

Um golpe no prestgio dos EUA

Aumento do castrismo

Preocupao do F. Castro,negociaes com a URSS


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Em Janeiro 1962, Cuba excluda da

OEA (muitos pases abstiveram-se) Em contrapartida, fortalecido o eixo

Cuba-URSS (ajuda militar) Ajuda a Fidel Castro (ameaa dos EUA)

Objectivos estratgicos:

URSS vulnervel em face da ameaa dos EUA Os msseis dos EUA na Turquia, que podem

atingir a URSS

Cuba como a plataforma que permite umaresposta simtrica


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At Setembro 1962 42 msseis com ogivas nucleares

Chegam por mar, em barcos civis,disfarados como equipamento

industrial Montados e preparados para

combate


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1962Na segunda metade de 1962, os

avies americanos fotografaramrampas de lanamento de msseis de

mdio alcance, instalados na ilhaOs msseis tem capacidade para atingir

o territrio americano


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Outubro 1962

Uma situao que vai para alm daquesto cubana:avaliao da capacidade de

retaliao americana?concesses em Berlim?


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3 guerra mundial??

Ataque da

Fora Area

Capacidadede destruirtodos os

msseis -?

Bloqueio vs.Quarentena


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22-23 de Outubro 1962 22: Kennedy dirige-se nao (televiso)

23: A OEA aprova a quarentena/bloqueiocubano dos EUA

23: bloqueio instalado (1000 km)

Negociaes entre Dobrynin e RobertKennedy

Cartas de Kruchev e PresidenteKennedy


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Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for

intermediate range ballistic missiles capable of traveling morethan twice as far-and thus capable of striking most of themajor cities in the Western Hemisphere, ranging as far northas Hudson Bay, Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru. In

addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons,are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while thenecessary air bases are being prepared

The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, ifallowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leadsto war. This nation is opposed to war. We are also true to ourword. Our unswerving objective, therefore, must be to

prevent the use of these missiles against this or any othercountry, and to secure their withdrawal or elimination fromthe Western Hemisphere.


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Acting, therefore, in the defense of our own security and of the

entire Western Hemisphere, and under the authority entrusted tome by the Constitution as endorsed by the resolution of theCongress, I have directed that the following initial steps be takenimmediately:

First: To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on alloffensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being

initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatevernation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensiveweapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, ifneeded, to other types of cargo and carriers. We are not at thistime, however, denying the necessities of life as the Sovietsattempted to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.


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Second: I have directed the continued and increased closesurveillance of Cuba and its military buildup. The foreign ministers

of the OAS, in their communiqu of October 6th, rejected secrecyon such matters in this hemisphere. Should these offensivemilitary preparations continue, thus increasing the threat to thehemisphere, further action will be justified. I have directed the

Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust that inthe interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians atthe sites, the hazards to all concerned of continuing this threat willbe recognized.

Third: It shall be the policy of this Nation to regard any nuclearmissile launched from Cuba against any nation in the WesternHemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the UnitedStates, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.

Fourth: As a necessary military precaution, I have reinforced ourbase at Guantanamo, evacuated today the dependents of ourpersonnel there, and ordered additional military units to be on a

standby alert basis.


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Seventh and finally: I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to alt andeliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat toworld peace and to stable relations between our two nations. Icall upon him further to abandon this course of world domination,

and to join in an historic effort to end the perilous arms race andto transform the history of man. He has an opportunity now tomove the world back from the abyss of destruction by returning tohis government's own words that it had no need to station

missiles outside its own territory, and withdrawing these weaponsfrom Cuba- by refraining from any action which will widen ordeepen the present crisis- and then by participating in a searchfor peaceful and permanent solutions.


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My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult anddangerous effort on which we have set out. No one canforesee precisely what course it will take or what costs orcasualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice andself-discipline lie ahead-months in which both our patience

and our strength will be tested-months in which manythreats and denunciations will keep us aware of ourdangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to donothing.

Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication ofright-not peace at the expense of freedom, but both

peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, wehope, around the world. God willing, that goal will beachieved.

Thank you and good night.


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24-25 de Outubro Os navios soviticos com a carga

duvidosa mudam o curso ou regressam

URSS As primeiras propostas de resoluo de

conflito: O bloqueio naval insuficiente para retirar osmsseis

Retirada dos msseis sobre a superviso daONU vs. Compromisso oficial dos EUA nosentido de no invadir Cuba

Os msseis (Cuba) contra os msseis (Turquia)


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Crise dos msseis de Cuba 26 de Outubro Kruchev cede: aceita

as condies americanas, i.e.desmontar o equipamento militar

ofensivo e lev-lo de volta para aURSS

Os EUA comprometam-se a renunciar invaso de Cuba e retirar os msseisinstalados na Turquia aps 1958

UMinho HRI 11 Cuba Crisis Distr

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