Existential quantifiers

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This article was downloaded by: [UQ Library] On: 11 November 2014, At: 00:07 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Acta Linguistica Hafniensia: International Journal of Linguistics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/salh20 Existential quantifiers John Anderson a a University of Edinburgh , Scotland Published online: 08 Dec 2011. To cite this article: John Anderson (1974) Existential quantifiers, Acta Linguistica Hafniensia: International Journal of Linguistics, 15:1, 1-27, DOI: 10.1080/03740463.1974.10414879 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03740463.1974.10414879 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Transcript of Existential quantifiers

Page 1: Existential quantifiers

This article was downloaded by: [UQ Library]On: 11 November 2014, At: 00:07Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Acta Linguistica Hafniensia: International Journal ofLinguisticsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/salh20

Existential quantifiersJohn Anderson aa University of Edinburgh , ScotlandPublished online: 08 Dec 2011.

To cite this article: John Anderson (1974) Existential quantifiers, Acta Linguistica Hafniensia: International Journal ofLinguistics, 15:1, 1-27, DOI: 10.1080/03740463.1974.10414879

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03740463.1974.10414879

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Existential quantifiers

EXISTENTIAL QUANTIFIERS by

J O H N ANDERSON

University of Edinburgh

0. I have argued in the course o f a discussion o f various aspectual distinc­tions that three underlying adnominal functions be allowed for (Anderson, 1973 a, § 4 . 3 . 1 ) , nom(inative), loc(ative) and abl(ative); and (elsewhere) that the lower predications in a causative construction are similarly dependent oh one o f these three (cf. Anderson, 1972 a, ch. 6 ) : *

(1) a. Fred tripped me (nom) b . Fred caused m e to trip (loc) c. Fred prevented me from tripping (abl)

Nouns (as well as verbs, as in these instances) can also be dependent on another N in any o f these three ways:

(2) a. The name (of) Fred (nom) b . The leg o f the chair (loc) c. Some o f the cheese (abl)

(cf. Anderson, 1973 a, § 4 . 3 . 2 ) . Thus, certain Ns may have dependent on them a nom, loc or abl on which is in turn dependent a N or V . With causatives the upper N is an 'empty' N which is the head o f a comple­ment structure. In the case o f the examples in (2) , the upper N is a quanti­fier (c) or an inalienable part (b) or the first (hypernymous) element in an appositive (naming) relation ( a ) . 1 While it seems to me that such a

* This paper is a slightly revised version of part of § 8.4 of my Ph.D. thesis (Anderson, 1972 a). I am grateful to Maureen Clark and Richard Hogg for a number of help­ful criticisms.

1 Actually, these latter instances, at least — i.e. those illustrated by (2) — may involve a reduction from an untensed (i.e. absolute rather than contingent) relative predication. And it is thus the lack of tensing, rather than a primitive adnominal character, which differentiates, for example, (2.b) from the structure associated with attribution of an alienable part. Alienability implies tensing. However, this refinement is not important

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proposal is consonant with a range of phenomena from different languages, the suggestion (exemplified in (2.c)) that a quantifier originates as a N immediately governing an ablative (i.e. P A R T I T I V E ) phrase containing another N — i.e. in a structure like that shown in ( 3 ) :

is apparently in conflict with another, well-known and in many ways attractive proposal that quantifiers originate as higher predicates. I am thinking in particular o f the analyses recently offered by Lakoff (e.g. 1970, 1971), whose precise formulation owes something to objections raised by Partee (1970) to earlier proposals o f his (Lakoff, 1965, A p p . F ) .

Lakoff argues that in sentences like ( 4 ) :

(4) Many men read books

the quantifier many originates as the predicate of a higher sentence, and that an alternative (though somewhat marginal) variant is ( 5 ) :

(5) The men who read books are many

in which the predicative and superordinate status of many is apparent. (4) differs from (5) with regard to the operation (in the case o f (4)) o f a rule o f 'quantifier-lowering' (henceforth QJL), whereby the quantifier is ' lowered on to ' the NP in the subordinate clause which is identical to its original subject (in the higher clause), as indicated in (6) : a

for the present discussion. Nor too is the possibility that quantifiers derive ultimately, like lexical nouns, from a predicate in a relative clause dependent (in this instance) on the 'quantifier N', i.e. the upper N in (3): this falls without our present concern.

2 This is an interpretation (I hope faithful) of the representations suggested by Lakoff in terms of the dependency structures proposed in Anderson, 1971a, 1973 a, b, 1972 c. I have interpreted relative clauses as involving a dependent nominative phrase con­taining a V (in accord with the assumption that in underlying representations Ns and Vs are universally joined by a functional element). They differ from complement structures in requiring in the dependent structure a N referentially identical to the governor (as in (6)). I ignore here and in what follows the clearly complex source for surface nouns, which appear to derive from the collapsing of a term (N, which bears the referential indexing) and a dependent predicate (a substantive V, which introduces the semantic content) - see Anderson, 1973 a, §§ 5.1.2; 5.1.4; 1972 a, ch. 8 - and cf. Bach, 1968; McCawley, 1970. Lakoff (1971: 238, fh.b) also proposes an alternative analysis ('somewhat closer to reality') in which quantifiers appear not to be assigned to underlying predicates but to a node labelled 'OJ, which apparently occurs in clauses lacking a predicate. However, this proposal is (as presented there) not sufficiently elaborated to permit evaluation.

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(Erg = ergative). The circled Ns are referentially identical. Many is thus lowered on to the subject phrase in the subordinate. What the character of the derived structure is (and what becomes of the higher nominative phrase, apart from an apparently ad hoc deletion) remains uncertain.

I f something like this derivation is well-motivated, then it would appear tc be rather difficult to reconcile with my proposal for some, many etc., which claims that they involve crucially an underlying partitive relation in which the N realized as many in (4) would immediately govern an abla­tive phrase containing men. In what immediately follows I shall try to show two things: firstly (in § 1), that my analysis can be reconciled with such a derivation for some quantifiers (and that this restriction has some support); and secondly (in § 2 ) , that there is, however, no reason to believe that the derivation Lakoff proposes is correct (even for this restricted set o f quanti­fiers).

1. I f we assume that Q L is, in some form, a valid explanation o f the relation between (5) and (4) , there is nevertheless no motivation for extending it to quantifiers like some, for whom there is no example bearing to (7) the relationship that (5) bears to ( 4 ) :

(7) Some men read books

Various arguments intended to justify Q L for quantifiers in general that have been proposed by Lakoff merely show the necessity for assuming some kind o f superordinate clause, rather than specifically a clause containing a predicative quantifier. — I shall take up these arguments in § 2. I f w e i«

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nevertheless persist in claiming that Q L has occurred in the derivation o f (7) , we must explain (not merely label) why it is that there is no surface variant containing some like (5) . This can be explained with reference to the analysis o f quantifiers as supra-nominals, but only if Q L is restricted to those quantifiers which appear in predicative position in sentences like (5) .

Consider the paradigms in ( 8 ) :

(8) A . 1. a. M a n y men read books b . The men who read books are many

2. a. A large number o f men read books b . The number o f men who read books is large

B. 1. a. Some men read books b .

2. a. A number o f men read books b .

From this it appears that the many sentences are paraphraseable by sentences involving large number; but some is paralleled by number alone. And whereas the sentence with a superficially superordinate many (A . l . b . ) is paralleled by A.2 .b , both b instances under B are unfilled. Now, they are unfilled, provided that we assume a common source for B.l and B.2, because in the composition o f neither o f them is a predicate (like large) involved. The b instance with superordinate many is possible because underlying it there is both a N (realized in A.2 as number) and a V (realized in A .2 as large). That is, the derivation of many involves both a supranominal N (consonant with the analysis o f quantifiers I have proposed) and a higher V (as required by LakofF's interpretation). W e merely have to assume that many is the shape assumed by large if number is superficially absent. 8 Compare a few I small number.

However, having in principle established the compatibility o f the supra-nominal analysis o f quantifiers, with a trimmed version o f LakofF's propo­sals (involving restricted Q L ) , we must now presume to look the gift-horse squarely in the mouth. This is because it seems to me that a potentially important principle is at stake in the acceptance or rejection o f one partic­ular aspect o f LakofF's analysis. It is not my intention to question the assumption (or the motivations adduced) that a higher predication con­taining a quantifier is involved in the derivation o f (4) or (7) - or indeed o f any non-group quantifier except possibly all (and related forms).

3 A lot of a apparently another variant in which the V has been subjoined (see below) to the N (lot - large + number).

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- All, as we shall see, is perhaps exceptional because it is presumably the variant o f some where the supra-nominal and the sub-nominal Ns are referentially identical. 4 - Rather, I shall argue against the notion that the quantifier is underlyingly the predicative element in this superordinate (even in instances like (5 ) ) , and I shall propose an explicitly different, but, I would contend, semantically more appropriate character for the higher clause.

2. Let us consider what arguments can be assembled for the notion that underlying (4) etc. is a structure containing a predicative quantifier in a superordinate sentence.

Firstly, and weakly, there is the existence of paraphrases like (5) . H o w ­ever, as we have observed, these are not found with all quantifiers. It is specifically only those quantifiers which, under the proposal made in § 1, consist both o f a supra-nominal N and a V that show such a variant. W e might then, following the argument of § 1, weaken our proposal con­cerning the superordinate and predicative character o f quantifiers to the following: certain quantifiers (like many, few but not some, all) are derived from the collapsing o f a supra-nominal N and a higher V . These are the quantifiers that can also be attributive (cf. Christophersen, 1939, § 16; Lakoff, 1970, 4 0 1 - 2 ; Carden, 1970): we can once more associate this possibility with their internal structure - but I shall not explore their derivation (presumably from a non-restrictive relative) here. They are also the quantifiers that can be compared (more, fewer), which again depends on assuming a predicative status.

However, on the one hand, the relating of '5) and (4) by restricted Q L depends, as we have observed, on the postulating o f a rather bizarre and complex rule with unspecified output. And I shall show below that one can, on the contrary, allow for the raising of the predicate dependent on the quantifier in the derivation o f (5) and the like by an independently motivated rule. O n the other.hand, Lakoff has adduced a number o f pieces o f evidence to show that some kind o f superordinate clause is required in the derivation o f all o f (4) , (5) and (7) . And the restriction o f Q L to (4)

4 On this, and for a discussion in general of the set relationships involving quantifiers and their terms, see Jespersen, 1949, particularly § 9.91; Hogg, 1971; Lee, 1971. For a more general account of the surface syntax of quantifiers and of some other recent work in this area, see Jackendoff, 1968. Actually, there are reasons for thinking that the sources of all, etc. are more complex than this, and that (in particular) they do not provide exceptions to what I have suggested concerning quantifiers; but an explication of this would involve us in a consideration of the interaction of quantifiers and negation, which I discuss elsewhere (Anderson, 1972 b).

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(excluding (7)) takes us even further from explaining this. I want now to look at some o f this evidence, which Lakoff claims as support for the superordinate predicative analysis of quantifiers but which I shall argue merely suggests that the quantifiers occur in some kind o f superordinate sentence.

Lakoff (1970, 398) points out there are sentences with some parallel to the pair with a few adduced by Partee, reproduced in ( 9 ) :

(9) a. Few rules are both explicit and easy to read

b . Few rules are explicit and few rules are easy to read

which are similarly non-synonymous — as compared with (10) :

(10) a. The few rules are both explicit and easy to read b . The few rules are explicit and the few rules are easy to read.

And he argues that this is explained if Q L is extended to some. But it is accounted for by any proposal in which the quantifier appears in a super­ordinate sentence. Thus, this observation is merely compatible with the (extended) notion o f Q L ; it does not constitute positive evidence for the superordinate predicate analysis of quantifiers.

Lakoff (1971, § 2) also takes up the sentences in (11) discussed by Partee (1970):

(11) a. Many men read few books b . Few books are read by many men

These again are for many speakers not synonymous. Lakoff provides (sig­nificantly, as it will appear) the following paraphrases for (11 .a) and (1 l .b ) respectively:

(12) a. There are many men who read few books b . There are few books which are read by many men

He proposes that underlying each o f (11) is a structure including three predications (relevant to the present discussion). The same predications are involved in either instance, and merit read booksj is the lowest in both. They are differentiated in that in the configuration underlying (11.a) the topmost clause predicates many o f me»j, and the second few o f booksj, whereas with (11 .b) the relative heights of these two predications is reversed. This is shown in (13), (13.a) underlying (11.a) and (13.b) , ( l l . b ) :

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In (13.a) many commands few, but not few many; in (13.b) the asymmetric command relation is reversed. Lakoff explains the absence of a passive variant for (11.a) and an active for ( l l . b ) (as we noted, these are not related as active to passive) with regard to a global derivational constraint, such that if the lower (commanded) quantifier comes also to command the commanding quantifier, then the originally higher must assume left­most position (if it is not marked off by contrastive stress). Thus (13.a) has no passive realization, in that it would infringe this constraint; and correspondingly (13.b) has no active.

Notice, however, that these considerations also provide no evidence for an underlying superordinate predicative status for many and few. They do not even show that there is more than one predication above men read books. There is certainly no surface variant o f (13) with three overt predications o f the type proposed. A n d the presence of the intervening predication is not necessary to the formulation of the constraint. There is, as we have observed, a variant o f (4) with bi-predicational structure, namely (5) . And there are such variants corresponding to (11.a) and ( l l . b ) , namely (14.a) and (14.b) respectively:

(14) a. The men who read few books are many b . The books which are read by many men are few.

But observe these two points. In the first place, there is no surface reflexion o f the intermediate clause in either instance, and its underlying presence apparently depends merely on the assumption that all such quantifiers are derived by Q L . Secondly, Lakoff simply identifies the topmost predications in the structures he proposes as underlying (11) with the corresponding surface clause in (14).

In the discussion that follows, I shall argue in favour of four points: (i) there is no motivation that I am aware of from the syntax of such sentences as (11) for positing the intermediate predications in (13) ; (ii) the (remaining) higher predication is o f a character quite different from that suggested by Lakoff, in that, in particular the quantifier is not a super­ordinate predicate; (iii) the variants in (14) are accordingly rather further from the underlying structure than they are in terms of LakofF's analysis; (iv) the rule o f Q L can as a consequence be dispensed with in favour of independently established processes.

Point (i) is confirmed if we can provide plausible derivations consonant with the requirements o f the derivational constraint and other evidence which do not require the presence o f such a clause, which, after all, involves

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us in somewhat strange (? relative) configurations. However, the discovery of evidence for some kind o f intermediate predication would not affect the proposals listed under (ii)—(iv), which are my main interest here, provided that this intermediate predication were structurally like the higher pre­dication I am going to suggest occurs in the structure underlying (4) etc. Indeed, I argue elsewhere (Anderson, 1972 b) that there appears to be some motivation for such a position from the syntax of negation and of universal quantifiers, given an analysis of these latter in terms o f a double negation.

I intend now to outline some indications of what the higher predication might be. W e shall then consider (in § 4) the processes which lead to the surface representations manifested in (4) , (11) and the like; and finally (in § 6) the variations o f these which eventuate in (12), (14) etc. Having given some consideration to the alternative source and derivation I am proposing, we shall (in § 5) be in a position to consider one further argument for Q L , which I shall argue is once more inconclusive.

3. Return now to (12) . Here we have instances o f the there is. . . construc­tion, which can occur above copulative locational predications (cf. e.g. Anderson, 1973 b , § 1; 1972 a, ch. 6) like that in (15) :

Both upper Ns are 'semantically empty': they have no attached substantive predicate. Thus, when the lower V is moved out from under the nominative

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phrase to be attached directly to the upper V , by a general process which I shall term V - A D J U N C T I O N ('VP-raising'), as in (16) :

both upper Ns may have a phrase from the lower clause copied on to them. This copying is governed by the X-principle (cf. Anderson, 1973 b , § 1, 1972 a, ch. 6 ) , such that copying results in reversal of the original se­quence. Thus the lower locative is copied into subject position, the lower subject is copied on to the upper nominative. The lower subject is deleted, and if the lower locative is pronominalized, we get (17.a), if the upper, (17 .b) :

(17) a. The table has a book on it b . There is a book on the table.

There is only one V present in surface structure: I assume this is due to S U B J U N C T I O N (cf. Anderson, 1971 b ; 1973 b , § 1) o f the lower V to the upper. The surface representation is perhaps as in (18) :

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(wherein the various nominative nodes have been removed by 'subject/ object pruning' — as too, on the previous cycle, the lower subject node in (16) ) .

In 'existential locatives' - i.e. where location is predicated absolutely and not limited to a particular place — there occurs an existential P R O -locative that can in such constructions be eventually deleted. Compare:

(19) a. There are lions in Africa b . There are lions (in existence)

In this instance, there may be no superficial indication whatsoever o f the lower locative predication. In lions exist the existential locative has been subjoined to its governing V rather than simply deleted.

Now, the sentences in (12) show a there is . . . construction with no reflex of the lower locative. W e can allow for the relevant aspects of their surface structure if in these instances too an existential predication comes immedi­ately below the there is. That is, there intervenes between the latter and the 'main clause' an existential predication whose locative phrase has been deleted and whose verb is subjoined to the upper V . Notice that we also find paradigms with non-deleted locatives, as in (20) :

(20) 1. a. Many men in our street read few books b . There are many men in our street who read few books

2. a. Few books in our library are read by many men b . There are few books in our library which are read by many

men.

However, at this juncture the question arises: what in (12) or (20.b) is existence, or location, predicated of? - Clearly, o f the leftmost quantifier phrase: i.e. o f many men . . . in (12.a) and of few books . . . in (12.b). It is this which distinguishes them semantically. In (12.a) the existence of many men such that they read few books is asserted; in (12.b) the existence o f few books such that they are read by many men is asserted. But this same distinction is what separates (11.a) from ( l l . b ) as well. (12) differ from (11) only in the presence o f the there is . . . predication: they differ as There are lions in existence differs from Lions exist (if we ignore the subjunction in the derivation of the latter). In both pairs there occurs the same alternation in existential assertions.

Thus, underlying (11.a) (and (12.a) - if we ignore the there is . . . con­struction) is a structure like that in (21) :

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1 ; I I i

many men read few books

(Once again, the circled Ns are referentially identical; similarly, the squared Ns, which by definition include referentially their governing Ns.) Underlying (11-b) (and (12.b)) is rather a structure in which existence is predicated o f few books. As under the superordinate predicate analysis, the absence of a passive corresponding to (11.a) and an active to ( l l . b ) can once more be attributed to Lakoff's constraint on mutually commanding quantifiers (as we shall see when we come to look at the subsequent development o f (21)) — though it must be reformulated somewhat to allow for the fact that one o f the quantifiers now occurs twice in the underlying representation, and only one o f these instances commands and is not com­manded by the other quantifier.

I want now, before proceeding to investigate the subsequent history o f (21) , to indicate that such an existential predication occurs not only above many and few but also above predications containing any non-group non-attributive quantifier, including cardinal numerals, including a (in those instances in which its presence is not simply due to an output condition — cf. Perlmutter, 1970, fn. 16, though I would include predicative nominals here). Compare with (12) the following:

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(22) a. There are j ^ V C 1 men (in our street) who read (many) books v J somej

b . There is a man (in our street) who reads (many) books.

I claim that these are related to the corresponding sentences in (23) :

{ Five 1 g \ men (in our street) read (many) books

b . A man (in our street) reads (many) books.

(though (23.b) without the bracketed in our street is somewhat marginal) in the same way as (12) are related to (11). The important exception to this is all — presumably because in its case the establishment o f the exist­ence or location o f a subset is tautologous (given its analysis in terms o f referential identity — cf. § l ) . s

Thus, above the 'main clause' o f all o f (22)-(23) is a clause predicating existence or location o f the (leftmost — if stress is non-contrastive) quanti­fier. Observe that such a proposal also resolves in a natural way the exist­ential status of Mary's unfortunate Norwegian (cf. Bach, 1968). The two interpretations of (24) differ as to whether the existential predication comes above the want or the marry clause:

(24) Mary wants to marry a Norwegian

as indicated in outline in (25.a) and (25.b) respectively:

(25) a.

Mary marry him

5 If this is correct, then whereas there is a superordinate existential (with few books as subject) in the structure underlying Few books are read by all men (cf. There are few books which are read by all men), this is lacking in the case of All men readfew books. But cf. note 4.

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b .

Mary marry him

In (25.a) the co-referential N comes within a complement sentence em­bedded in the clause below the existential rather than that clause itself. This distribution is confirmed by the paraphraseability o f the (25.a) inter­pretation of (24) by (26.a) and the (25.b) interpretation by (26 .b) :

(26) a. There is a Norwegian (who(m)) Mary wants to marry b . Mary wants there to be a Norwegian for her to marry

in which the there is . . . predication comes in each instance immediately above the existential. Similarly, the alternative interpretations associated with the object in / read a book every day or the subject in Someone comes to see me every day depend on the relative heights of the underlying existential and frequentative predications.

The account I have offered assumes that only one quantifier in any simple predication is associated with a higher locative structure (and if its origin­ally higher occurrence comes to be commanded by another quantifier, it will in the absence o f contrastive stress precede that quantifier). I remain rather diffident concerning this particular aspect o f my proposals, and the point is not crucial to the present argument. I merely indicate that Lakoff provides no explicit evidence to the contrary.

4. Consider now the subsequent development of (21) . I want to approach a discussion o f this rather indirectly, in that I intend firstly to show the operation of the processes involved in the derivation of another construc­tion which I have discussed in more detail elsewhere (cf. Anderson, 1973a, § 4.4; 1973b, § 2 ; 1972c) . The structure of the higher predica­tion in (21) (though not the internal structure of the Ns) is exactly that

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which I have proposed for higher temporal predications. Compare (27), which underlies Fred left yesterday:

(27)

yesterday

Fred leave

Once again (cf. (15)—(16)), by V-adjunction, the lower V is moved out from under the empty nominative phrase to be attached directly to the upper V , as in (28) :

(28)

nom

leave

(I shall henceforth silently assume subject/object node pruning at the end o f each cycle) . Fred can now be copied on to the subject N in the higher clause, and the original deleted. There is no other empty N present, so no interchange o f sequence is involved. Once again (cf. 18) the lower V is subjoined to the upper; but in this instance a copy of the locative phrase is also subjoined to the upper V (though without deletion o f the original) 6

— I shall term this 'tense-marking'. This results (after pruning) in (29) :

6 Actually, what is copied is the time-referentially specified N (the term) but not its dependent predicate (given the analysis of nouns outlined in note 2) — i.e. (roughly) 'pastness' but not 'one day away from the day of locution'.

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The derivation o f (21) eventuating in (11.a) can be exacdy parallel to that I have described, with two minor differences: there is no tense-marking (since the locative phrase is not indexed for time) and the existential locative is (as elsewhere) deleted. This development is outlined in (30) , which takes as its starting-point ( 21 ) :

O n e other difference is that the upper subject is not derived by copying; it is identical to the lower from the start. The result is the same, and the lower subject is in both instances deleted, leaving the identical upper sub-

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ject (whatever its source). A n analogous derivation can be sketched out for ( l l . b ) , but with the additional operations required by the passive.

An interesting dilemma now arises with regard to sentences with overt locative, like (20) or (22) . Thus far we have assumed a requirement that any one quantifier in a simple sentence presupposes a higher existential predication with the quantifier phrase as subject. If we generalize to in­stances like (20), then underlying them must be a structure like that in (31 ) :

many men read few books

Similarly, with (17) an existential predication will intervene between the there is . . . clause and the locative predication. The alternative, given that we have interpreted existentials as a type o f copulative locative predication, is to formulate the requirement, informally, as follows: a quantifier in a non-copulative locative sentence requires above it a copulative locative predication in which the quantifier phrase is subject. (Observe that this does not exclude existentials above other copulative locatives — which possibility is required b y There are few students who are in many classes.) I d o not know o f any crucial empirical evidence bearing on this decision. H o w ­ever, the different 'behaviour' o f quantifiers in copulative locative senten­ces, such that e.g. on one reading There are few students in many classes and Many classes have few students in them are synonymous, whereas there is a reading for the first which is distinct (but is like that for There are few students who are in many classes), tends to support the latter alternative. However, I shall not investigate this here.

The derivation o f sentences in which the existential quantifier does not appear in subject position presents further problems, whose resolution suggests a modification to the account proposed above. Consider again (24) , 2

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under say, interpretation (25.b) . Here, we would arrive, in terms o f the kind o f derivation I proposed for (21), at a derived structure like that abbreviated in (32) :

(32)

Mary wants to marry him

From this point, a straightforward relative development occurs in the derivation o f (26.a). But how do we arrive at the structure manifested as (24) ? Let us consider the structure of relatives a little more closely.

The relative configuration involves necessarily (whatever other restric­tions may be appropriate) an 'antecedent' N which has subordinate to it within a dependent predication a N to which it is identical (in some sense, including at least referentially). Relative-formation involves the substitu­tion o f a relative pronoun for this identical N-configuration (or a clause-initial replica o f it). However, in the derivation of (24) V-adj'unction destroys the relative structure, and no relative pronoun can be substituted. The originally subordinate N is thereby 'stranded'. In the resolution o f this I assume the application of a rule which SUPERIMPOSES the original antecedent on to this term. This results in the structure immediately under­lying (24). The last step might appear to be as ad hoc as Q L ; but there are reasons for thinking that a similar process may be required elsewhere in the grammar.

The following paradigm, in particular, has often been observed:

(33) a. What I read was a novel b . It was a novel that I read c . I read a novel

(with contrastive stress on novel in (33.c)) , all o f them serving to focus on novel. Now, Akmajian (1970) has argued that (33.b) be derived from a structure like that underlying (33.a) by extraposition. (33.a) is a relative construction; thus, the effect o f extraposition would be once more to strand the potential relative pronoun, unless relative-formation had already taken place, as indeed it has in (33.b) . V-adjunction, however, must precede

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relative-formation, and, as we have seen, does result in stranding. W e can allow for (33.c) as deriving from the same source if we take it as the instance in which V-adjunction and thus stranding occurs prior to relative-forma­tion. Once again (cf. 32) , this is resolved by superimposing a referentially identical phrase from the upper sentence (a novel) on to the stranded term. (Cf. Postal's 'contrast movement ' (1971, ch. 19).) This leaves in the original upper predication an empty N (realized in (33.b) as it) and the copula. Presumably, as elsewhere, the empty N is filled by the lower subject (the original being deleted), and the lower V is subjoined to the copula. This produces the structure immediately underlying (33.c).

This same derivation is also available to existential quantifiers which come to occupy subject position. It therefore seems preferable to interpret their development thus rather than as involving an extension o f comple­ment subject deletion to just subjective stranded relatives. Notice too that this might also in part explain the fact that contrastive stress may serve the same function as precedence in marking the existential quantifier when the asymmetric command relation is broken: once again, such stress is associated with relative stranding.

5. W e can now take up a further set o f phenomena which apparently support the superordinate predicate analysis o f quantifiers. A n d this con­cerns the restrictions connected with phrasal conjunction discussed by Lakoff, 1970, 411-9. He observes that while (34.a) is well-formed, (34.b) is not:

(34) a. Few men and many women left b . *Few men and many women left together.

Moreover (35) is ambiguous between a phrasal conjunction interpretation and sentential conjunction:

(35) John and Mary left

(34.a) permits only the sentential conjunction interpretation; and (34 .b) , which is marked as phrasal by the presence o f together, is ill-formed. Finally, (36), which (according to Lakoff & Peters, 1969) is derived from a phrasal conjunction via conjunct movement:

(36) Few men left with many women

is grammatically well-formed. Lakoff proposes to explain this in terms o f the interaction o f Q L and

Ross's coordinate structure constraint. In the derivation o f (34) with phrasal

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conjunction the lowering o f the quantifier into the coordinate structure is blocked by Ross's constraint. If, as in the derivation of (36), the conjunc­tion has been broken by the operation of conjunct movement, Ross's con­straint does not apply and Q L may proceed. Thus, the explanation of the restrictions in (34)- (36) depends on the existence of Q L (together with an independently motivated constraint).

However, again it seems to me that this evidence is inconclusive with regard to the alleged predicative status of quantifiers. Consider the kind of derivations required for these sentences in terms of the account I have proposed. Underlying (34.b) and (36) is a structure like that in (37) :

(37)

nom

'existence'

few men and many women

After V-adjunction we get (38) :

(38) V

nom

'existence'

few men and many women

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EXISTENTIAL QUANTIFIERS 2 1

Observe that the lower subject is not identical to the upper; it is only if conjunct movement has applied (as in (36)) that identity is ensured and the derivation can proceed under the first interpretation I considered in § 4. Under the second (preferred) alternative, Ross's constraint will in this instance too block the subsequent development, involving as it does super-imposition. Thus, once again, an underlying predicative status for quanti­fiers is not essential to an explanation of these restrictions.

6. I f a there is . . . predication comes above the existential, then the deriva­tion can either develop as outlined in § 4, up to and including subjunction, resulting in (39) :

which, after V-adjunction, copying (cf. (15)—(16)), deletion of the exist­ential phrase but no subjunction of the intermediate V to the topmost one, eventuates in (40 ) :

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or there may be no movement of the lower V but simply deletion of the existential phrase and the formation of a straightforward relative, as in (41 ) :

(41)

there are many men who read few books

(40) immediately underlies (42.a) and (41), (42 .b) :

(42) a. There are many men read few books b . There are many men who read few books

Unless one supposes some such derivation for (42.a) the absence of a relative pronoun remains unaccounted for. Observe too that such variants as (42.a) appear to be a general phenomenon with quantifier predications:

{ were five women 1 \ followed me this morning

was a woman J

I conclude that their existence provides some support for the development for (21) I have proposed and for the appropriateness o f that representation.

Note too that we also find such a variant with clefts, as in (44 .b) :

(44) a. It's a boy who wants to see you b . It's a b o y wants to see you.

As noted by e.g. Bever & Langendoen (1971, 442), these are, along with there is . . . sentences, the sole instances in which in Contemporary English the subject relative can be 'omitted' (though even these variants are rather marginal for many speakers). 7 Significantly, they are also the other instance in which we suggested that relative stranding was involved. Thus, (44.a)

7 Vivian Salmon has pointed out to me that there are varieties of English in which sen­tences like / have a shoe needs mending are also possible. This seems to offer a little further support for the analysis of have (as like there is) sketched out in § 3; but I shall not pursue such derivations, since a number of other issues are also crucially involved. Niels Ege has further brought to my attention instances like / know an old chap comes around every day ( ^ I know that an old chap comes around every day). I shall not pursue this here, but merely note that the development of such a 'stranding' variant (cf. 'normal' relative / know an old man who comes around every day) depends once again on the presence of an existential predication involving.a quantifier (-> an).

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A boy is then superimposed on the stranded relative (indicated by 'who ' in (45)) to produce the structure more immediately underlying (44.b) . I f copying of this lower subject on to the upper and subjunction o f the lower V to the copula follow, then we get rather A boy wants to see you.

Further support for our position comes from the fact that variants like those in (14) can be accommodated by a very natural extension o f rules already formulated. As suggested above (in § 1) we can associate the avail­ability of these with the character of the internal structure o f many and few, i.e. as consisting o f a N with a dependent V . But formerly we regarded this V as being derived by (restricted) Q L . (14.a) was thus in this respect closer to the underlying representation than (11.a). I am going to suggest now that the V starts off as a dependent o f the N and is in fact raised (by an already established process) in the development of (14). However, we can still relate this distinctiveness o f many and few (as compared with some, all) to the occurrence o f the V .

The structure in (21) is indeed abbreviated in one aspect crucial to our present concerns: the internal structure o f many is not shown. Let us accord­ingly expand in this respect the configuration governed by the higher nominative N , and substitute for (21) the structure represented in (46 ) :

represents the outcome o f a regular relative development followed by extra­position, whereas underlying (44.b) is, after V-adjunction, the structure abbreviated in (45) :

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Observe now that this makes it clear that there are two mutually command­ing Vs dependent (at greater or less distance) on the nominative N in the existential predication. Either is available for V-adjunction. In the derivation of (11 .a), as we have seen, the read V is attached to the upper V . But suppose that the manyjlarge V is so moved, and thus undergoes the development we originally proposed for the read clause. The read predication in this instance will then develop as a normal relative clause. I suggest that this is exacdy what happens in the development of (14.a) and (47) :

(47) The number o f men who read few books is large

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the existence of which as a paraphrase for (14. a) is totally unaccounted for by an analysis o f quantifiers as higher predicates. Recall too that some is not complex in the sense represented (for many) in (46) : thus the ab­sence o f * The men who read few books are some follows from our analysis of the structure o f quantifiers, given the kind of derivation proposed here.

7. The derivations outlined in § 6 allow for (12.a), (14.a) and (47), in the crucial respects, in terms o f the same processes as account for (11.a). Thus, even with many and few, there is no necessity to appeal to an other­wise unmotivated rule o f Q L to relate such pairs. An analysis in terms o f a partitive relation with an associated superordinate existential (together with a development involving various independendy motivated transform­ational operations) provides what seems to me a satisfactory account o f the relevant range o f observations. This analysis, I suggest, is at least as plaus­ible on syntactic grounds as the proposals made by Lakoff. But perhaps this is not the most important moral to be drawn from the preceding discussion. Both sets o f underlying representations are intended to be semantically natural. But I would claim that the representations involving quantifiers as higher predicates provide inadequate characterizations o f the difference in meaning between, say, (11.a) and ( l l . b ) . It is this which seems to me the most serious defect in Lakoff's proposals, which otherwise contain, as will be clear even from my critical account, many valuable insights, some of which are crucial to the argument I have developed. I am making a plea then for more attention to notional appropriacy. It may indeed be that (at least at the present stage in our understanding) underlying representations are relatively under-determined by conventional syntactic arguments. Notional considerations are then crucial, and equally available to public scrutiny and evaluation.

Summary:

Quantifiers originate as the head of a partitive construction, but at least one

quantifier in a superficially simple sentence also appears in the underlying structure

in a super-ordinate existential predication. Evidence for the occurrence of this

predication and for its existential character is presented. Some and many are dis­

tinguished as simple (cf. a number of) and complex quantifiers (cf. a large number of), respectively. The relating of such representation to surface structures is shown to

involve processes which have independent motivation. The development of there

is . . . variants and variants (in the case of the complex quantifiers many, few) with

the quantifier in predicative position are shown to also derive in a natural way

from the proposed type of underlying representation.

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R E F E R E N C E S

Akmajian, A., 1970: 'On Deriving Clefts from Pseudo-Clefts', Linguistic Inquiry 1, 149-68.

Anderson, J. M . , 1971a: The Grammar of Case: Towards a Localistic Theory, Cam­bridge University Press, London.

Anderson, J. M . , 1971b: 'Outline of a Proposal for the Lexicalisation of Complex Structures', SL 25, 1-8.

Anderson, J. M . , 1972 a: A Study of Grammatical Functions in English and Other Languages, Ph.D. thesis, University of Edinburgh.

Anderson, J. M . , 1972 b: 'Universal Quantifiers'. Edinburgh Working Papers in Linguistics 1, 1-41.

Anderson, J. M . , 1972 c: 'Remarks on the Hierarchy of Quasi-Predications', R. R. Ling. 17, pp. 23-44, 121-140, 193-202, 319-335.

Anderson, J. M . , 1973 a: An Essay concerning Aspect: Some Considerations of a General Character arising from the Abbe Darrigol's Analysis of the Basque Verb, Mouton, The Hague.

Anderson, J. M . , 1973 b: 'Maximi Planudis in Memoriam', to appear in Gener­ative Grammar in Europe (ed. by F. Kiefer and N. Ruwet), Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 20-47.

Bach, E., 1968: 'Nouns and Noun Phrases', in Universals in Linguistic Theory, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, pp. 90-122.

Bever, T . G. & D. T. Langendoen, 1971: 'A Dynamic Model of the Evolution of Language', Linguistic Inquiry 2, 433-63.

Carden, G., 1970: 'On Post-Determiner Quantifiers', Linguistic Inquiry 1, 415-27. Christophersen, P., 1939: The Articles: A Study of their Theory and Use in English,

Munksgaard, Copenhagen. Hogg, R . M . , 1971: 'Both versus AW, ms. Jackendoff, R. S., 1968: 'Quantifiers in English', FL 4, 422-42. Jespersen, O . , 1949: A Modern English Grammar, V I I , Allen & Unwin and Munks­

gaard, London and Copenhagen.

Lakoff, G., 1965: On the Nature of Syntactic Irregularity, Report NSF-16, Mathematical Linguistics and Automatic Translation, The Computation Laboratory of Har­vard University; published 1970 as Irregularity in Syntax, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York.

Lakoff, G., 1970: 'Repartee, or a Reply to "Negation, Conjunction and Quantifiers"', FL 6, 389-422.

Lakoff, G., 1971: 'On Generative Semantics', in Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, Anthropology and Psychology (ed. by D . D. Steinberg and L. A. Jakobovitz), Cambridge University Press, London, pp. 232-96.

Lakoff, G. and S. Peters, 1969: 'Phrasal Conjunction and Symmetric Predicates', in Modem Studies in English (ed. by D. A. Reibel and S. A . Schane), Prentice-Hall, Englewpod Cliffs, New Jersey, pp. 113-42.

Lee, D . A. , 1971: 'Quantifiers and Identity in Relativisation', Lingua 27, 1-19.

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McCawley, J. D., 1970: 'Where Do Noun Phrases Come From?' in Readings in English Transformational Grammar (ed. by R.A.Jacobs and P. S. Rosenbaum), Ginn-Blaisdell, Waltham, Mass., pp. 166-83.

Partee, B. Hall, 1970: 'Negation, Conjunction and Quantifiers: Syntax vs. Seman­tics', FL 6, 153-65.

Perlmutter, D. M . , 1970: 'On the Article in English', in Progress in Linguistics (ed. by M . Bierwisch and K . E. Heidolph), Mouton, The Hague, pp. 233-48.

Postal, P. M . , 1971: Cross-over Phenomena, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York.

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